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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I f
era1 of USAFBI and Army member of the U.S. Military Mission in
London-under direct control of the commanding general of U S .
Field Forces in the former capacity, of the War Department in the
latter.g6H e continued also in charge of SPOBS, now vested with en-
larged functions, and direct communications between that office and
AAF Headquarters were a u t h o r i ~ e d . ~ ~In his efforts to secure for
Army air forces in the British Isles the organizational system he pre-
ferred, General Arnold had two avenues of approach. H e could
attempt to convince Chaney, now vested with full authority in
USAFBI, either through the commanding general of U.S. Field
Forces or by direct communication with SPOBS; or as Deputy Chief
of Staff, he could try to influence the War Department, through the
Chief of Staff, to change Chaney’s directive. Neither maneuver was
immediately successful. The confusion in Chaney’s multiple command
was enhanced by the shortage of trained staff officers, a phenomenon
which was then common enough but which confirmed his resistance
toward the multiplication of air headquarters in England.’’ There
was, too, some of the perennial friction between air and ground
officers in his staff. SPOBS had been made up largely of Air Corps
officers 99 and Chaney himself was a command pilot of long standing,
but initial contingents of the U.S. Army bomber command found
some of his “G’s’’ at USAFBI “not very friendly to Air effort.” loo
As for the efforts to have Chaney’s directive modified, time and the
maturing of Anglo-American strategy were to lend point to Arnold’s
arguments.
In January 1942, Arnold submitted to GHQ a chart illustrating the
organization he favored for USAFBI, and on the 21st received ten-
tative approval subject to Chaney’s concurrence.1o1 On the 26th,
Arnold enumerated for Marshall the air units scheduled for the
United Kingdom, both for 1942 and for eventual deployment, re-
questing that the War Department accept his chart as a “general
guide” and activate the air force and constituent commands (bomber,
interceptor, air base) which it called for.lo2The several headquarters
were ordered activated,lo3 but the War Department was not yet
fully committed to Arnold’s plan.
On 24 January, Arnold had informed Chaney of Marshall’s tenta-
tive approval of an air force for USAFBI with Spaatz as commander
and with three subordinate commands, suggesting that the force be
located in the York area.lo4Chaney objected to that site, preferring
5 8 2

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.