Documents / Document

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I f
era1 of USAFBI and Army member of the U.S. Military Mission in
London-under direct control of the commanding general of U S .
Field Forces in the former capacity, of the War Department in the
latter.g6H e continued also in charge of SPOBS, now vested with en-
larged functions, and direct communications between that office and
AAF Headquarters were a u t h o r i ~ e d . ~ ~In his efforts to secure for
Army air forces in the British Isles the organizational system he pre-
ferred, General Arnold had two avenues of approach. H e could
attempt to convince Chaney, now vested with full authority in
USAFBI, either through the commanding general of U.S. Field
Forces or by direct communication with SPOBS; or as Deputy Chief
of Staff, he could try to influence the War Department, through the
Chief of Staff, to change Chaney’s directive. Neither maneuver was
immediately successful. The confusion in Chaney’s multiple command
was enhanced by the shortage of trained staff officers, a phenomenon
which was then common enough but which confirmed his resistance
toward the multiplication of air headquarters in England.’’ There
was, too, some of the perennial friction between air and ground
officers in his staff. SPOBS had been made up largely of Air Corps
officers 99 and Chaney himself was a command pilot of long standing,
but initial contingents of the U.S. Army bomber command found
some of his “G’s’’ at USAFBI “not very friendly to Air effort.” loo
As for the efforts to have Chaney’s directive modified, time and the
maturing of Anglo-American strategy were to lend point to Arnold’s
arguments.
In January 1942, Arnold submitted to GHQ a chart illustrating the
organization he favored for USAFBI, and on the 21st received ten-
tative approval subject to Chaney’s concurrence.1o1 On the 26th,
Arnold enumerated for Marshall the air units scheduled for the
United Kingdom, both for 1942 and for eventual deployment, re-
questing that the War Department accept his chart as a “general
guide” and activate the air force and constituent commands (bomber,
interceptor, air base) which it called for.lo2The several headquarters
were ordered activated,lo3 but the War Department was not yet
fully committed to Arnold’s plan.
On 24 January, Arnold had informed Chaney of Marshall’s tenta-
tive approval of an air force for USAFBI with Spaatz as commander
and with three subordinate commands, suggesting that the force be
located in the York area.lo4Chaney objected to that site, preferring
5 8 2

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.