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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I f
era1 of USAFBI and Army member of the U.S. Military Mission in
London-under direct control of the commanding general of U S .
Field Forces in the former capacity, of the War Department in the
latter.g6H e continued also in charge of SPOBS, now vested with en-
larged functions, and direct communications between that office and
AAF Headquarters were a u t h o r i ~ e d . ~ ~In his efforts to secure for
Army air forces in the British Isles the organizational system he pre-
ferred, General Arnold had two avenues of approach. H e could
attempt to convince Chaney, now vested with full authority in
USAFBI, either through the commanding general of U.S. Field
Forces or by direct communication with SPOBS; or as Deputy Chief
of Staff, he could try to influence the War Department, through the
Chief of Staff, to change Chaney’s directive. Neither maneuver was
immediately successful. The confusion in Chaney’s multiple command
was enhanced by the shortage of trained staff officers, a phenomenon
which was then common enough but which confirmed his resistance
toward the multiplication of air headquarters in England.’’ There
was, too, some of the perennial friction between air and ground
officers in his staff. SPOBS had been made up largely of Air Corps
officers 99 and Chaney himself was a command pilot of long standing,
but initial contingents of the U.S. Army bomber command found
some of his “G’s’’ at USAFBI “not very friendly to Air effort.” loo
As for the efforts to have Chaney’s directive modified, time and the
maturing of Anglo-American strategy were to lend point to Arnold’s
arguments.
In January 1942, Arnold submitted to GHQ a chart illustrating the
organization he favored for USAFBI, and on the 21st received ten-
tative approval subject to Chaney’s concurrence.1o1 On the 26th,
Arnold enumerated for Marshall the air units scheduled for the
United Kingdom, both for 1942 and for eventual deployment, re-
questing that the War Department accept his chart as a “general
guide” and activate the air force and constituent commands (bomber,
interceptor, air base) which it called for.lo2The several headquarters
were ordered activated,lo3 but the War Department was not yet
fully committed to Arnold’s plan.
On 24 January, Arnold had informed Chaney of Marshall’s tenta-
tive approval of an air force for USAFBI with Spaatz as commander
and with three subordinate commands, suggesting that the force be
located in the York area.lo4Chaney objected to that site, preferring
5 8 2

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.