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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
of the tactical units under a single head, the new arrangement was far
from ideal. Most of the specific administrative difficulties which arose
during the next few years stemmed from two basic inconsistencies:
divided authority between the Air Corps and the corps areas and
between the two elements within the Air Corps.6oAs to the first, the
Air Corps presented a unified front in attempting to secure an ex-
empted status' for all airfields; such status, minus the important
prerogative of court-martial jurisdiction, was granted in May I 936,
revoked in November 1 9 4 0 . ~ ~In respect to its internal organization,
Air Corps opinion, like the Air Corps itself, was divided. The ultimate
purpose of the air arm was effectiveness in combat. Command respon-
sibility for that mission within the Air Corps devolved upon the Com-
manding General, GHQ Air Force. But he had no voice in the
individual training and indoctrination of his crews or in the develop-
ment and procurement of equipment. Over those functions the Office
of the Chief of the Air Corps (OCAC) had control. The two agencies
were on the same command echelon, reporting separately to the Chief
of Staff. Essentially it was a revival of the functional dualism which
had proved so mischievous in 1917-18. Andrews and Westover, agree-
ing on the need of a single chain of command under the Chief of Staff,
differed as to which of the offices should take precedence. Year after
year, studies and conflicting recommendations were made without
result. Finally, under the stress of an incipient rearmament program,
the consolidation was effected on I March 1939. By a War Depart-
ment directive, both the GHQ Air Force and the OCAC were made
directly responsible to the Chief of the Air Corps.'j2
The new arrangement was to prove short-lived, but, since it coin-
cided with the inauguration of a vast expansion of the Air Corps t
under threats from abroad, it may serve here as a convenient terminus.
A quarter-century had passed since the first official recognition had
been accorded the air arm by the act of 18 July 1914.Air Corps of-
ficers, no longer militantly crusading in public f or independence, had
little cause for complacency with the fruits of their long struggle.
Read out of context, the story of that struggle can be made to appear,
as the Baker Board interpreted it, an attempt of ambitious officers to
further their own petty interests by escape from the salutary control
of a beneficent General Staff. Certainly air officers had a normal share
* Le., administrative independence from the corps areas.
-f See below, Chap. 4.
32

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