“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
the U.K.”;and to join RAF Bomber Command in operations against
Germany. These tasks had nothing in common to require an over-all
air commander for USAFBI, and since interceptor units, save those
in Northern Ireland, would be under operational control of RAF
Fighter Command, the AAF would need no interceptor command.
Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking strategic targets chosen by Chaney and
the Air Ministry, it was proper that there should be a USAFBI
bomber command. On the other hand, supply and maintenance should
be performed locally by task force commanders, with the aid of a
unified theater service base but without a special air service command.
Graphically, Chaney illustrated his ideas with this simple chart: 9 3
HQ USAF in GB
I I I I I
HQ USAF ICE- HQ USA INTER- HQ USA HQ 1st PRO- HQ USA BASE
LAND (ICE- CEPTOR COM- BOMBER VISIONAL COMMAND IN
COMMAND) IRELAND UK (“TOKEN CATION ZONE
LAND BASE MAND IN N. COMMAND BRIGADE IN UK (COMMUNI-
FORCE”) USAFGB)
Arnold and Chaney were agreed that unity of command should be
achieved and that the theater commander should be freed from con-
cern for details of administration and tactics, but they differed sharply
as to the means of effecting those ends. General Chaney, clinging to
a literal interpretation of RAINBOW No. 5, wished to delegate re-
sponsibilities along regional rather than functional lines. H e had the
advantage of an intimate knowledge of local conditions and of a
sound position in the chain of command. General Arnold, looking
toward the future, saw the problem in light of the imminent reorgani-
zation of the W a r Department and of the tremendous air force sug-
gested for the European theater in AWPD/ I . These conflicting views
were not easily resolved, but the tide was turning in Arnold’s direc-
tion; to what degree he was responsible for that trend may be sensed
from the documents.
When war came, no action had been taken on Chaney’s recom-
mendation or on Arnold’s counterproposal-McNarney was then en
route to Washington with the former’s letter of 5 December and a
more detailed explanation of the ideas of his chiefeg”The directive of
I I December 95 which put RAINBOW No. 5 into effect strengthened
Chaney’s hand. O n 8 January he was designated commanding gen-
5 80