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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”26 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 the U.K.”;and to join RAF Bomber Command in operations against Germany. These tasks had nothing in common to require an over-all air commander for USAFBI, and since interceptor units, save those in Northern Ireland, would be under operational control of RAF Fighter Command, the AAF would need no interceptor command. Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation with the RAF, of attacking strategic targets chosen by Chaney and the Air Ministry, it was proper that there should be a USAFBI bomber command. On the other hand, supply and maintenance should be performed locally by task force commanders, with the aid of a unified theater service base but without a special air service command. Graphically, Chaney illustrated his ideas with this simple chart: 9 3 HQ USAF in GB I I I I I HQ USAF ICE- HQ USA INTER- HQ USA HQ 1st PRO- HQ USA BASE LAND (ICE- CEPTOR COM- BOMBER VISIONAL COMMAND IN COMMAND) IRELAND UK (“TOKEN CATION ZONE LAND BASE MAND IN N. COMMAND BRIGADE IN UK (COMMUNI- FORCE”) USAFGB) Arnold and Chaney were agreed that unity of command should be achieved and that the theater commander should be freed from con- cern for details of administration and tactics, but they differed sharply as to the means of effecting those ends. General Chaney, clinging to a literal interpretation of RAINBOW No. 5, wished to delegate re- sponsibilities along regional rather than functional lines. H e had the advantage of an intimate knowledge of local conditions and of a sound position in the chain of command. General Arnold, looking toward the future, saw the problem in light of the imminent reorgani- zation of the W a r Department and of the tremendous air force sug- gested for the European theater in AWPD/ I . These conflicting views were not easily resolved, but the tide was turning in Arnold’s direc- tion; to what degree he was responsible for that trend may be sensed from the documents. When war came, no action had been taken on Chaney’s recom- mendation or on Arnold’s counterproposal-McNarney was then en route to Washington with the former’s letter of 5 December and a more detailed explanation of the ideas of his chiefeg”The directive of I I December 95 which put RAINBOW No. 5 into effect strengthened Chaney’s hand. O n 8 January he was designated commanding gen- 5 80
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