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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“United Press”36 pages
P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N sion when war came, and it was generally assumed that SPOBS or that mission, with Chaney in command, would form the nucleus of USAFBI.” This assumption had been officially confirmed by No- vember 1 9 4 1 , ~ ’and hence throughout his year overseas Chaney, in one capacity or another, was charged with determining the organiza- tional structure for U.S. forces in Britain. On 2 0 September he wrote to General Marshall concerning this “matter of prime importance,” outlining a system of operational and administrative controls based on his concept of the RAINBOW No. 5 task forces.’O A few weeks later he was called back to Washington on temporary duty, and there on 7 November General Arnold and members of the Air Staff described to him a new type of theater air force which Lt. Gen. Frank M. Andrews was finding successful in the Caribbean.“ When Chaney re- turned to London a few days later, he carried a letter from Arnold which urged the adoption of this system in the United Kingdom.” General Arnold’s scheme reflected on a lower echelon the forth- coming reorganization of the W a r Department; some important fea- tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp cleavage between air and ground elements in the theater, integrating the former into a “composite air force” under a single air commander who should be directly responsible to Chaney as commanding general of USAFBI. T h e air force was to comprise a bomber, an interceptor, and a service command. All air units would be assigned to this force and would not be responsible to the subcommanders of the several task forces listed in RAINBOW No. 5. Such a scheme would insure for the air component unity of command and integrity of forces, while relieving Chaney of administrative and tactical details; it was also flexible enough to accommodate the vast air force which might eventually be deployed in England. Chaney’s reply, a long letter of 5 December, consisted of a critique of Arnold’s proposal and a description of his own plan, essentially that which he had suggested to Marshall in September.’’ Chaney thought that Arnold’s desire for separate air and ground organizations was based upon a misconception of RAINBOW No. 5. Ground forces designated therein were small, and save for the token force existed only for protection of air and naval bases-hence no ground force commander was needed. Air forces would have two missions: to pro- vide, in certain areas, an “air defense, integrated into the air defense of * See above, pp. 163-64. 579
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