“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N
sion when war came, and it was generally assumed that SPOBS or
that mission, with Chaney in command, would form the nucleus of
USAFBI.” This assumption had been officially confirmed by No-
vember 1 9 4 1 , ~ ’and hence throughout his year overseas Chaney, in
one capacity or another, was charged with determining the organiza-
tional structure for U.S. forces in Britain. On 2 0 September he wrote
to General Marshall concerning this “matter of prime importance,”
outlining a system of operational and administrative controls based on
his concept of the RAINBOW No. 5 task forces.’O A few weeks later
he was called back to Washington on temporary duty, and there on
7 November General Arnold and members of the Air Staff described
to him a new type of theater air force which Lt. Gen. Frank M.
Andrews was finding successful in the Caribbean.“ When Chaney re-
turned to London a few days later, he carried a letter from Arnold
which urged the adoption of this system in the United Kingdom.”
General Arnold’s scheme reflected on a lower echelon the forth-
coming reorganization of the W a r Department; some important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage between air and ground elements in the theater, integrating
the former into a “composite air force” under a single air commander
who should be directly responsible to Chaney as commanding general
of USAFBI. T h e air force was to comprise a bomber, an interceptor,
and a service command. All air units would be assigned to this force
and would not be responsible to the subcommanders of the several
task forces listed in RAINBOW No. 5. Such a scheme would insure
for the air component unity of command and integrity of forces,
while relieving Chaney of administrative and tactical details; it was
also flexible enough to accommodate the vast air force which might
eventually be deployed in England.
Chaney’s reply, a long letter of 5 December, consisted of a critique
of Arnold’s proposal and a description of his own plan, essentially
that which he had suggested to Marshall in September.’’ Chaney
thought that Arnold’s desire for separate air and ground organizations
was based upon a misconception of RAINBOW No. 5. Ground forces
designated therein were small, and save for the token force existed
only for protection of air and naval bases-hence no ground force
commander was needed. Air forces would have two missions: to pro-
vide, in certain areas, an “air defense, integrated into the air defense of
* See above, pp. 163-64.
579