The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N
sion when war came, and it was generally assumed that SPOBS or
that mission, with Chaney in command, would form the nucleus of
USAFBI.” This assumption had been officially confirmed by No-
vember 1 9 4 1 , ~ ’and hence throughout his year overseas Chaney, in
one capacity or another, was charged with determining the organiza-
tional structure for U.S. forces in Britain. On 2 0 September he wrote
to General Marshall concerning this “matter of prime importance,”
outlining a system of operational and administrative controls based on
his concept of the RAINBOW No. 5 task forces.’O A few weeks later
he was called back to Washington on temporary duty, and there on
7 November General Arnold and members of the Air Staff described
to him a new type of theater air force which Lt. Gen. Frank M.
Andrews was finding successful in the Caribbean.“ When Chaney re-
turned to London a few days later, he carried a letter from Arnold
which urged the adoption of this system in the United Kingdom.”
General Arnold’s scheme reflected on a lower echelon the forth-
coming reorganization of the W a r Department; some important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage between air and ground elements in the theater, integrating
the former into a “composite air force” under a single air commander
who should be directly responsible to Chaney as commanding general
of USAFBI. T h e air force was to comprise a bomber, an interceptor,
and a service command. All air units would be assigned to this force
and would not be responsible to the subcommanders of the several
task forces listed in RAINBOW No. 5. Such a scheme would insure
for the air component unity of command and integrity of forces,
while relieving Chaney of administrative and tactical details; it was
also flexible enough to accommodate the vast air force which might
eventually be deployed in England.
Chaney’s reply, a long letter of 5 December, consisted of a critique
of Arnold’s proposal and a description of his own plan, essentially
that which he had suggested to Marshall in September.’’ Chaney
thought that Arnold’s desire for separate air and ground organizations
was based upon a misconception of RAINBOW No. 5. Ground forces
designated therein were small, and save for the token force existed
only for protection of air and naval bases-hence no ground force
commander was needed. Air forces would have two missions: to pro-
vide, in certain areas, an “air defense, integrated into the air defense of
* See above, pp. 163-64.
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