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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
two Air Corps generals to head up the office was in itself an indica-
tion of the prominence assigned to air power in existing plans for the
war against Germany.
General Chaney opened his headquarters in the American Embassy
building on 19 May 1941.'' His mission was a complex one, involving
preparation for the possible establishment of US. ground and air
forces, assistance in allocating lend-lease materiel, advising General
Marshall on the employment of Army forces in the United Kingdom,
and, in general, handling any problems involved in implementing
ABC-I." Chaney attacked his manifold duties with energy and dis-
patch. H e reported immediately to the British Chiefs of Staff Com-
mittee, and on 6 June began what was to be a close association with
the Air Ministry; throughout his tour of duty, his relations with the
British were good.83 Chaney himself, or members of his staff, in-
spected potential sites for Army installations in Iceland, Scotland,
Northern Ireland, and England, and made tentative arrangements
with the British for development of desired bases.84 In September,
Chaney accompanied the Harriman-Beaverbrook mission to Mos-
During the months just preceding and following Pearl Harbor,
Chaney, often working with special AAF missions from or in the
States, was concerned with a number of special projects: TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector;
SHADOW 82, a plan for the AAF to understudy and eventually
to relieve RAF fighter units in Northern Ireland; TURBINLITE, a
design to provide an AAF night fighter squadron with special RAF
equipment and indoctrination.86 These projects were adversely af-
fected by new priorities established early in the war; in spite of much
effort expended, all proved abortive. Throughout his incumbency,
General Chaney, like every AAF commander, was hampered by a
dearth of properly trained officers and by frequent changes in plans
in Washington. There was, too, until a clarification of his directive
in September, some ambiguity in the relations between SPOBS and
the military attach6 in respect to responsibilities for technological
aspects of air materiel." But however consuming in time and attention
these duties may have been, the most important function of SPOBS
was to prepare for the establishment and control of U.S.forces in
Great Britain as provided in RAINBOW No. 5.
At the time of his assignment to SPOBS, General Chaney had been
informed that he would probably remain as head of the military mis-
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