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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
two Air Corps generals to head up the office was in itself an indica-
tion of the prominence assigned to air power in existing plans for the
war against Germany.
General Chaney opened his headquarters in the American Embassy
building on 19 May 1941.'' His mission was a complex one, involving
preparation for the possible establishment of US. ground and air
forces, assistance in allocating lend-lease materiel, advising General
Marshall on the employment of Army forces in the United Kingdom,
and, in general, handling any problems involved in implementing
ABC-I." Chaney attacked his manifold duties with energy and dis-
patch. H e reported immediately to the British Chiefs of Staff Com-
mittee, and on 6 June began what was to be a close association with
the Air Ministry; throughout his tour of duty, his relations with the
British were good.83 Chaney himself, or members of his staff, in-
spected potential sites for Army installations in Iceland, Scotland,
Northern Ireland, and England, and made tentative arrangements
with the British for development of desired bases.84 In September,
Chaney accompanied the Harriman-Beaverbrook mission to Mos-
During the months just preceding and following Pearl Harbor,
Chaney, often working with special AAF missions from or in the
States, was concerned with a number of special projects: TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector;
SHADOW 82, a plan for the AAF to understudy and eventually
to relieve RAF fighter units in Northern Ireland; TURBINLITE, a
design to provide an AAF night fighter squadron with special RAF
equipment and indoctrination.86 These projects were adversely af-
fected by new priorities established early in the war; in spite of much
effort expended, all proved abortive. Throughout his incumbency,
General Chaney, like every AAF commander, was hampered by a
dearth of properly trained officers and by frequent changes in plans
in Washington. There was, too, until a clarification of his directive
in September, some ambiguity in the relations between SPOBS and
the military attach6 in respect to responsibilities for technological
aspects of air materiel." But however consuming in time and attention
these duties may have been, the most important function of SPOBS
was to prepare for the establishment and control of U.S.forces in
Great Britain as provided in RAINBOW No. 5.
At the time of his assignment to SPOBS, General Chaney had been
informed that he would probably remain as head of the military mis-
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.