“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
two Air Corps generals to head up the office was in itself an indica-
tion of the prominence assigned to air power in existing plans for the
war against Germany.
General Chaney opened his headquarters in the American Embassy
building on 19 May 1941.'' His mission was a complex one, involving
preparation for the possible establishment of US. ground and air
forces, assistance in allocating lend-lease materiel, advising General
Marshall on the employment of Army forces in the United Kingdom,
and, in general, handling any problems involved in implementing
ABC-I." Chaney attacked his manifold duties with energy and dis-
patch. H e reported immediately to the British Chiefs of Staff Com-
mittee, and on 6 June began what was to be a close association with
the Air Ministry; throughout his tour of duty, his relations with the
British were good.83 Chaney himself, or members of his staff, in-
spected potential sites for Army installations in Iceland, Scotland,
Northern Ireland, and England, and made tentative arrangements
with the British for development of desired bases.84 In September,
Chaney accompanied the Harriman-Beaverbrook mission to Mos-
During the months just preceding and following Pearl Harbor,
Chaney, often working with special AAF missions from or in the
States, was concerned with a number of special projects: TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector;
SHADOW 82, a plan for the AAF to understudy and eventually
to relieve RAF fighter units in Northern Ireland; TURBINLITE, a
design to provide an AAF night fighter squadron with special RAF
equipment and indoctrination.86 These projects were adversely af-
fected by new priorities established early in the war; in spite of much
effort expended, all proved abortive. Throughout his incumbency,
General Chaney, like every AAF commander, was hampered by a
dearth of properly trained officers and by frequent changes in plans
in Washington. There was, too, until a clarification of his directive
in September, some ambiguity in the relations between SPOBS and
the military attach6 in respect to responsibilities for technological
aspects of air materiel." But however consuming in time and attention
these duties may have been, the most important function of SPOBS
was to prepare for the establishment and control of U.S.forces in
Great Britain as provided in RAINBOW No. 5.
At the time of his assignment to SPOBS, General Chaney had been
informed that he would probably remain as head of the military mis-
578