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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N
terms, were in the nature of a general guide rather than of a specific
directive. All armed forces of both nations serving in the United
Kingdom and British home waters (including Iceland) were to be
under the strategic direction of the appropriate British commander in
chief; all U.S. forces were to be under the immediate control of the
commanding general of the U.S. Army Forces in Great Britain (or
British Isles-USAFBI) .74 What that would mean in actual practice,
no one knew; an American general could write somewhat perplexedly
in September I 94 I :
I find certain terms not susceptible of standard interpretation by our own
people, with the general result of a somewhat cloudy issue. I keep struggling
with “strategical direction,” “operational control,” and “administrative com-
mand”, . . . I am not trying to start an argument but I am trying to call
attention to the need for evolving a practical and efficient command system
under circumstances for which I know no p r e ~ e d e n t . ~ ~
RAINBOW No. 5 had vested the commanding general of USAFBI
with the duty of developing such a system, giving him “authority to
arrange with the Air Ministry and the War Office concerning the or-
ganization and location of our task forces and operational control.” ‘‘
Until war should invoke RAINBOW No. 5 , there would of course
be no USAFBI commander, but as an interim means of liaison, the
two nations had agreed to exchange military missions: the British
Joint Staff Mission a t Washington, the American Military Mission
at London.” The American mission was to consist of offices known
respectively as the Army Special Observer Group (SPOBS) and the
Naval Special Observer Group (SPENAVO) .
Ostensibly the establishment of SPOBS merely regularized a prac-
tice already in operation, for in 1940 the Air Corps had sent a number
of officers of various grades to watch the Battle of Britain.” Among
the senior officers was Maj. Gen. James E. Chaney, a man of wide
military experience; his tour was especially appropriate in view of an
earlier assignment as a military attach6 in Europe and of his current
dual command over the Air Defense Command and what was to be-
come the vital Northeast Air District.* After six weeks in England,
Chaney had returned in November 1940 to render an optimistic re-
port on Britain’s chance of surviving the air blitz.TvIn the following
April he was ordered back to London as commander of SPOBS, with
Brig. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney as his chief of staff.*’ The choice of
+ See above, pp. 152-53.
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