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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
for autonomy, it was also in some degree prophetic; for within a few
months both authors were involved in the arduous task of providing
a sound administrative and command structure for the Army's largest
overseas air force-that scheduled to operate from the United King-
dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure prominently in this
chapter.
The ABC-I report of 2 7 March 1941 had enunciated two principles
for the control of combined operations: unity of command in each
theater, and integrity therein of the forces of each nation." Born of
bitter experience in World War I, those principles were cherished
by both Americans and British, and the early allocation to each of
theaters of primary strategic responsibility facilitated more specific
arrangements once the United States entered the war. The first prac-
tical test came in the Southwest Pacific, where the ABDA Command
was established in January I 942 under those trying circumstances
which have earlier been dcscribed.t The command problem in the
United Kingdom was in some respects less complex, and in the ab-
sence of sustained enemy attacks its solution was of less immediate
urgency. Yet because of the strategic importance of the European
theater, the organization of American and British forces therein be-
came a matter of grave moment. The British, naturally, had been
charged with primary strategic responsibility in that area. With the
adoption first of BOLERO, then of TORCH, the question of an
expeditionary-as opposed to the theater-command structure was
raised. Meanwhile the organization of the U.S. forces in Great Britain
had to be determined, as well as the internal structure of the air com-
ponent. The Army Air Forces was deeply concerned with the or-
ganizational problem a t each of these three levels, but of most interest
here is the process by which the Eighth Air Force was established
under the European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA) .
Aside from its intrinsic significance, the story aptly illustrates a point
made in a previous context: $ that regardless of the legal position of
the AAF as a service and training organization without combat func-
tions, its chief was in fact a most powerful agent in the conduct of
war in the several theaters.
The command agreements in ABC-I, couched in most general
* See above, p. 138.
t See above, pp. 367-71.
$ See above, pp. 265-67.
5 76

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