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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”26 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 on 24 July by inquiring if U.S. air support for TORCH would be drawn from strength assigned to BOLERO.63From one as familiar with the aircraft situation as Sir Charles, that must have been a rhetorical question. There was no other source to tap, and the Joint Chiefs specifically stated that heavy and medium bomber groups would be shifted from BOLERO assignments to A f r i ~ a . ~ ”General Spaatz thought it might even be necessary to use all AAF units in the United Kingdom for TORCH.65 Nor was TORCH the only successful rival. On 7 July the Com- bined Chiefs of Staff had taken under consideration a proposed schedule of deployments according to which the AAF was to have in the United Kingdom by April 1943 a total of 3,640 combat planes.66But in the meeting of 24 July, the Combined Chiefs had agreed to divert from this force fifteen combat groups of various categories * to spearhead projected offensives in the Pacific.67 This decision Arnold had vainly opposed on the ground that constant fluctuation in BOLERO assignments “makes our course seem vacillat- ing.” T o his mind, the Southwest Pacific loomed as a more formid- able rival of accepted plans than TORCH, which after all was to be a blow against German power, if not at its source. As Marshall had pointed out in London on 24 July, the American concept of the air war against Germany had been that the AAF would operate against Germany from any suitable base, and that in winter weather Africa might offer some advantages over the United Kingdom.60 This was perhaps an indirect reference to AWPD/I.t That plan, with its design for shuttling between England and Africa, had con- templated the use of very long-range bombers not yet in production; neither B-17’s nor B-24’S could hit Germany from African bases. General Spaatz was not enthusiastic about the prospects. H e wrote Arnold on I I August, “Regardless of what operations are conducted in any other theater, in my opinion, this [England] still remains the only base area from which to launch aerial operations to obtain air supremacy over Germany, and until such air supremacy is established there can be no successful outcome of the war.”’O Intensive opera- tions could not be conducted from both areas at the same time with the limited forces available. Arnold’s chief of staff, Maj. Gen. George * Groups were as follows: three heavy bombardment, two medium bombardment, two light bombardment, two fighter, two observation, four transport. A fuller treat- ment of this decision will appear in Volume IV. t See above, pp. 148-49. 574
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