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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N
warrant it, but if by 1 5 September an operation in the following
spring should appear impracticable, a decision should be made to
launch a combined attack against North and Northwest Africa at
the earliest possible date before I December. This recommendation
was accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the ~ 4 t h . ~ ‘Ap-
parently Roosevelt gave his tentative approval in a telephone conver-
sation on the following day.58 The provision to hold off until 1 5
September for a firm decision to mount TORCH, as the revived and
revised GYMNAST plan was called, was wisely scrapped. It is diffi-
cult to say just when the two governments made a formal commit-
ment. On 3 0 July, Admiral Leahy told the Combined Chiefs of Staff,
then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed”
that T O R C H was on; and so it was.59 Intensive planning began
immediately in London. With an eye on French sensibilities, the CCS
had preferred an American commander for the operation, and on 7
August, Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who as commanding gen-
eral of the European Theater of Operations had participated in the
London conference, was informed of his appointment.“
Neither the new code name nor the choice of an American leader
could obscure the fact that the strategy which had long guided JCS
thought had been sharply wrenched if not broken. Planning for
ROUNDUP-and even for an emergency SLEDGEHAMMER-was
supposed to continue. But the Joint Chiefs in their memorandum of
24 July had realistically accepted the fact that T O R C H in 1942meant
no ROUNDUP in 1943.~‘For the Army Air Forces this might mean
a return to the time schedule suggested in AWPD/r, with its spring
1944 invasion, but the circumstances were to be importantly modified
by TORCH.
General Arnold had from March gone along with the War Depart-
ment General Staff in its preference for SLEDGEHAMMER, though
ROUNDUP would have fitted more aptly into AWPD’s concept of
the war. Arnold was not in London in late July, but with other mem-
bers of the JCS he had been opposed to TORCH. In July as in April
the British had proposed, in partial substitution for the second front,
an intensification of their bomber offensive over Germany, where
recent thousand-plane attacks on Cologne and Essen had already
given earnest of what was to come.62But T O R C H ruled out for the
time being any effective participation in this campaign by the AAF,
much as it was to their liking. Sir Charles Portal had raised the issue
573

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.