“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N
warrant it, but if by 1 5 September an operation in the following
spring should appear impracticable, a decision should be made to
launch a combined attack against North and Northwest Africa at
the earliest possible date before I December. This recommendation
was accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the ~ 4 t h . ~ ‘Ap-
parently Roosevelt gave his tentative approval in a telephone conver-
sation on the following day.58 The provision to hold off until 1 5
September for a firm decision to mount TORCH, as the revived and
revised GYMNAST plan was called, was wisely scrapped. It is diffi-
cult to say just when the two governments made a formal commit-
ment. On 3 0 July, Admiral Leahy told the Combined Chiefs of Staff,
then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed”
that T O R C H was on; and so it was.59 Intensive planning began
immediately in London. With an eye on French sensibilities, the CCS
had preferred an American commander for the operation, and on 7
August, Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who as commanding gen-
eral of the European Theater of Operations had participated in the
London conference, was informed of his appointment.“
Neither the new code name nor the choice of an American leader
could obscure the fact that the strategy which had long guided JCS
thought had been sharply wrenched if not broken. Planning for
ROUNDUP-and even for an emergency SLEDGEHAMMER-was
supposed to continue. But the Joint Chiefs in their memorandum of
24 July had realistically accepted the fact that T O R C H in 1942meant
no ROUNDUP in 1943.~‘For the Army Air Forces this might mean
a return to the time schedule suggested in AWPD/r, with its spring
1944 invasion, but the circumstances were to be importantly modified
by TORCH.
General Arnold had from March gone along with the War Depart-
ment General Staff in its preference for SLEDGEHAMMER, though
ROUNDUP would have fitted more aptly into AWPD’s concept of
the war. Arnold was not in London in late July, but with other mem-
bers of the JCS he had been opposed to TORCH. In July as in April
the British had proposed, in partial substitution for the second front,
an intensification of their bomber offensive over Germany, where
recent thousand-plane attacks on Cologne and Essen had already
given earnest of what was to come.62But T O R C H ruled out for the
time being any effective participation in this campaign by the AAF,
much as it was to their liking. Sir Charles Portal had raised the issue
573