“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
planners should be ready with other alternatives: GYMNAST, or
campaigns in Norway or the Iberian peninsula.49Planning responsi-
bilities were divided, with the Americans taking GYMNAST, the
British the other two project^.^'
Actually the Washington conference had postponed rather than
decided the central issue of the second front for 1942, but with only
three months of favorable weather remaining, postponement was al-
most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the
27th. In informed circles there it was generally accepted that there
would be no cross-Channel push that year.51 On 8 July the Prime
Minister informed Roosevelt that conditions favorable to SLEDGE-
HAMMER would probably not arise, and suggested that the Ameri-
cans push GYMNAST planning while the British worked on other
agreed alternative~.~~T o the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this message seemed
to endanger ROUNDUP as well as SLEDGEHAMMER. Unani-
mously in favor of BOLERO with either a 1942 or 1943 D-day, they
were equally opposed to GYMNAST as an expensive diversion of
dubious value. Since April, they had sensed a certain lack of en-
thusiasm among their British opposite members for a large-scale
invasion through France, and unless the British would support whole-
heartedly such a venture by 1943, the Joint Chiefs were prepared to
turn to the Pacific for a showdown with Japan.53
These views were communicated to the President on 10 July.54
A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and
a small staff flew to England to make a last endeavor to persuade the
British to go along with SLEDGEHAMMER. This the British were
unwilling to do. The memory of Dunkirk was still fresh and subse-
quent defeats in Africa had not lessened their respect for the German
army. They pointed again to practical difficulties which had been
urged in April and which they thought the Americans underestimated
-particularly the shortage in landing craft and the time factor. The
American position was the weaker because they could not in 1942
carry their share of the load. O n 2 2 July it was definitely agreed that
there would be no second front in Europe in 1 9 4 2 . ~ ~Discussion then
turned to those alternatives upon which the Combined Staff Planners
had been engaged.
O n the 24th, the U.S. Joint Chiefs presented a new proposal for
operations in 1942-43.56Preparations for ROUNDUP were to con-
tinue without abatement so long as the Russian situation seemed to
5 7 2