“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N
meager to serve as a reliable guide, but in general the British
were pessimistic concerning the Soviet Union’s chances of survival.
SLEDGEHAMMER had been always thought of as an emergency
operation, yet now the British chiefs of staff were dubious of its wis-
dom under any conditions: an operation of its contemplated mag-
nitude would offer little relief to the U.S.S.R., and if that country
collapsed the expedition might prove a serious tactical loss. The
British had been examining alternative projects-a lodgment at Brest
or Cherbourg, large-scale raids (Dieppe was then in the offing), or a
campaign in Norway-and they understood that President Roosevelt’s
anxiety to get U.S. troops into action in 1942 had led him to examine
other possibilities, including an offensive from Australia and the re-
vival of GYMNAST.45 The latter plan might offer effective relief
to Auchinleck in the Middle East-a second front to benefit the Brit-
ish rather than the Soviets; yet after mature deliberation, the Com-
bined Chiefs stood squarely and “without reservations” behind
decisions made at London in mid-April. Those decisions were indorsed
in an informal meeting on 19 June,46and more definitively in a paper
approved on the z IS^,^? Therein it was declared as considered opinions
of the CCS that: ( I ) the United States and Great Britain should ad-
here to their resolve ro push BOLERO; ( 2 ) no other offensive opera-
tion should be undertaken in 1942 save in a grave emergency; ( 3 )
specifically, GYMNAST should not be adopted under existing
conditions; and (4) planning for an emergency attack on western
Europe in 1942 should be continued. This should have left
ROUNDUP with highest priority, SLEDGEHAMMER a possi-
bility, and ruled out their most formidable rival, the North African
operation. What happened at the government level is not entirely
clear. Brig. Gen. Asa N. Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air
Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill had made a
successful plea to the President “for a lot of assistance in the Middle
East,” despite objections from the American chiefs of staff .48 The
formal record of the Combined Chiefs indicates no sudden change in
strategy. On Z I June, a t a White House meeting, the President and
Prime Minister accepted the sense of the CCS recommendations,
though with an escape clause. Plans for ROUNDUP in 1943 were to
be pushed, but the two nations must be prepared to act in 1942.
Operations in France or the Low Countries would yield greatest re-
sults and should be considered, but if they appeared impractical, the
57’