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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”26 pages
P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N meager to serve as a reliable guide, but in general the British were pessimistic concerning the Soviet Union’s chances of survival. SLEDGEHAMMER had been always thought of as an emergency operation, yet now the British chiefs of staff were dubious of its wis- dom under any conditions: an operation of its contemplated mag- nitude would offer little relief to the U.S.S.R., and if that country collapsed the expedition might prove a serious tactical loss. The British had been examining alternative projects-a lodgment at Brest or Cherbourg, large-scale raids (Dieppe was then in the offing), or a campaign in Norway-and they understood that President Roosevelt’s anxiety to get U.S. troops into action in 1942 had led him to examine other possibilities, including an offensive from Australia and the re- vival of GYMNAST.45 The latter plan might offer effective relief to Auchinleck in the Middle East-a second front to benefit the Brit- ish rather than the Soviets; yet after mature deliberation, the Com- bined Chiefs stood squarely and “without reservations” behind decisions made at London in mid-April. Those decisions were indorsed in an informal meeting on 19 June,46and more definitively in a paper approved on the z IS^,^? Therein it was declared as considered opinions of the CCS that: ( I ) the United States and Great Britain should ad- here to their resolve ro push BOLERO; ( 2 ) no other offensive opera- tion should be undertaken in 1942 save in a grave emergency; ( 3 ) specifically, GYMNAST should not be adopted under existing conditions; and (4) planning for an emergency attack on western Europe in 1942 should be continued. This should have left ROUNDUP with highest priority, SLEDGEHAMMER a possi- bility, and ruled out their most formidable rival, the North African operation. What happened at the government level is not entirely clear. Brig. Gen. Asa N. Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill had made a successful plea to the President “for a lot of assistance in the Middle East,” despite objections from the American chiefs of staff .48 The formal record of the Combined Chiefs indicates no sudden change in strategy. On Z I June, a t a White House meeting, the President and Prime Minister accepted the sense of the CCS recommendations, though with an escape clause. Plans for ROUNDUP in 1943 were to be pushed, but the two nations must be prepared to act in 1942. Operations in France or the Low Countries would yield greatest re- sults and should be considered, but if they appeared impractical, the 57’
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