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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 386 …More threatening were Rommel’s forces in North Africa, for the very existence of the air…
  • p. 387 …the route over which the Far East Air Force had received its thirty-five heavy bombers…
  • p. 551 …Formerly commander of the Far East Air Force in the Philip- * See above, pp. 396-97…
  • p. 561 …of an air force, depended upon a line of communications extending across the Indian and At…
  • p. 570 …the American air force would be used in the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean area…
  • p. 571 …Accordingly, on 24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations under RAF supervision…
  • p. 577 …involved in estab- lishing and operating an air force in Asia. The report of the Grady…
  • p. 630 …Policy for Disposition of US and British Air Forces.” l6 This memorandum greatly extended the scope…
  • p. 797 …MacArthur argued that now was a pro- pitious moment to rush forces from the Indian and…
  • p. 819 …5 8 - 6 7 Eighth Air Force, I, 326ff.; Achtung Indianer, a history of VIII FC…
  • p. 850 …See also CBI; Air Forces, Tenth AF. 336407 3537 356, 3803 395-96, q857 496 India…
T H E A R M Y A I R A R M B E T W E E N T W O W A R S
“the only entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air forces remains the ultimate decisive
factor in war.” T h e board was firmly opposed to either the unified de-
fense department or the independent air force. T h e history of the air
arm showed, it believed, that “the Air Corps has virtually been inde-
pendent since its inception”; that production failures of 19 I 7- I 8 had
occurred because of its practical exemption from General Staff con-
trol; and that independent air force operations had not been decisive in
the war. Hence the report concluded that “the time has arrived for the
Air Corps to become in all respects a homogeneous part of the Army,
under General Staff control, and be subject to military coordination,
study, influence and operation.” 5 6 Less, not more, autonomy was the
cure for Air Corps ills. T h e desired results could be obtained by
eliminating the now vacant post of Assistant Secretary of War; mak-
ing the Chief of the Air Corps responsible for individual training, pro-
curement, and supply under the Secretary; and following the Drum
Board’s recommendation for establishing a GHQ air force under the
Chief of Staff.
One civilian, James H. Doolittle, filed a minority report, advocating
separation of the Air Corps from the Army.57
T h e Howell commission was free from W a r Department domina-
tion, and many felt that its verdict might run counter to that of the
Baker Board. However, after the latter’s report it appeared wiser to
give the GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures,
and Howell’s group made no recommendations on the organization
of military a~iation.~’T h e reorganization suggested by Baker went
into effect on I March 1935.59 Tactical units scattered through the
nine corps areas were assigned to the GHQ Air Force, with head-
quarters at Langley Field; its three wings were located at Langley
(Va.) , Barksdale (La.), and March (Calif.) fields. As Commanding
General, GHQ Air Force, Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews was respon-
sible for organization, training, and operation of the force, reporting
to the Chief of Staff in peace, the commander of the field forces in
war. The Chief of the Air Corps, Maj. Gen. Oscar Westover, retained
responsibility for individual training, procurement, and supply. Ad-
ministrative control of the air bases remained in the hands of the sev-
eral corps area commanders.
Thus, although the GHQ Air Force provided an improved com-
mand structure for operations by concentrating a considerable share
3 ’

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.