Documents / Document
This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”26 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R A R M B E T W E E N T W O W A R S “the only entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the Army, which “with its own air forces remains the ultimate decisive factor in war.” T h e board was firmly opposed to either the unified de- fense department or the independent air force. T h e history of the air arm showed, it believed, that “the Air Corps has virtually been inde- pendent since its inception”; that production failures of 19 I 7- I 8 had occurred because of its practical exemption from General Staff con- trol; and that independent air force operations had not been decisive in the war. Hence the report concluded that “the time has arrived for the Air Corps to become in all respects a homogeneous part of the Army, under General Staff control, and be subject to military coordination, study, influence and operation.” 5 6 Less, not more, autonomy was the cure for Air Corps ills. T h e desired results could be obtained by eliminating the now vacant post of Assistant Secretary of War; mak- ing the Chief of the Air Corps responsible for individual training, pro- curement, and supply under the Secretary; and following the Drum Board’s recommendation for establishing a GHQ air force under the Chief of Staff. One civilian, James H. Doolittle, filed a minority report, advocating separation of the Air Corps from the Army.57 T h e Howell commission was free from W a r Department domina- tion, and many felt that its verdict might run counter to that of the Baker Board. However, after the latter’s report it appeared wiser to give the GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group made no recommendations on the organization of military a~iation.~’T h e reorganization suggested by Baker went into effect on I March 1935.59 Tactical units scattered through the nine corps areas were assigned to the GHQ Air Force, with head- quarters at Langley Field; its three wings were located at Langley (Va.) , Barksdale (La.), and March (Calif.) fields. As Commanding General, GHQ Air Force, Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews was respon- sible for organization, training, and operation of the force, reporting to the Chief of Staff in peace, the commander of the field forces in war. The Chief of the Air Corps, Maj. Gen. Oscar Westover, retained responsibility for individual training, procurement, and supply. Ad- ministrative control of the air bases remained in the hands of the sev- eral corps area commanders. Thus, although the GHQ Air Force provided an improved com- mand structure for operations by concentrating a considerable share 3 ’
Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.