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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N
statement of allocation policy which the Combined Chiefs might act
on after their
The discussions were opened in London on 26 May, first in a gen-
eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold
reviewed the aircraft situation in the U.S. armed forces and the effect
of commitments to China and the U.S.S.R.; he stressed the President’s
desire that “every appropriate American-made aircraft be manned and
fought by our own crews.” 35 This principle the British were willing
to accept if it carried the corollary determination “to bring into ac-
tion against the enemy at the earliest possible date in the appropriate
theaters the greatest strength in fully trained air forces that it was
possible to create out of the combined aircraft production, trained
manpower and shipping of the United Nations.” 3 5 Several days of
intensive study and debate followed, as Americans and British pre-
sented their respective views on problems of allocation, deployment,
supply, maintenance, and operations. An VIII Bomber Command
officer remarked that “the meetings were in the nature of a horse
trade.” ’’ An old hand a t this sort of give-and-take, Arnold confessed
that he found it “exceedingly difficult to conform 1 0 0 % with the
principles” insisted on by the two governments. On the 30th’ he
presented Portal with a memorandum outlining the American reac-
tion to the Essentially the document represented a com-
promise, and Arnold saw only a few issues which promised any great
difficulty in solution: the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for long-range
bombers, which would saddle the AAF with a burden more appro-
priately the Navy’s under the U.S. organizational system; and the
competitive demands for light bombers, a type badly needed for any
air-ground co-operation, which must come almost entirely from U.S.
factories. In his reply of the 31st, Portal recognized “what a very
real effort you have made to meet our point of view.” He commented
on the controversial points and suggested that the agreement be con-
summated after Arnold’s return to washing tor^.^'
His suggestion was followed. After further negotiations in Wash-
ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I June,
Air Vice Marshal J.C. Slessor signing for Portal.“ The correlative
principles accepted in London were repeated, with the added pro-
viso that revisions in allocation should be so framed that combined
strength in each theater should be maintained or increased. To con-
567

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.