“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N
statement of allocation policy which the Combined Chiefs might act
on after their
The discussions were opened in London on 26 May, first in a gen-
eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold
reviewed the aircraft situation in the U.S. armed forces and the effect
of commitments to China and the U.S.S.R.; he stressed the President’s
desire that “every appropriate American-made aircraft be manned and
fought by our own crews.” 35 This principle the British were willing
to accept if it carried the corollary determination “to bring into ac-
tion against the enemy at the earliest possible date in the appropriate
theaters the greatest strength in fully trained air forces that it was
possible to create out of the combined aircraft production, trained
manpower and shipping of the United Nations.” 3 5 Several days of
intensive study and debate followed, as Americans and British pre-
sented their respective views on problems of allocation, deployment,
supply, maintenance, and operations. An VIII Bomber Command
officer remarked that “the meetings were in the nature of a horse
trade.” ’’ An old hand a t this sort of give-and-take, Arnold confessed
that he found it “exceedingly difficult to conform 1 0 0 % with the
principles” insisted on by the two governments. On the 30th’ he
presented Portal with a memorandum outlining the American reac-
tion to the Essentially the document represented a com-
promise, and Arnold saw only a few issues which promised any great
difficulty in solution: the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for long-range
bombers, which would saddle the AAF with a burden more appro-
priately the Navy’s under the U.S. organizational system; and the
competitive demands for light bombers, a type badly needed for any
air-ground co-operation, which must come almost entirely from U.S.
factories. In his reply of the 31st, Portal recognized “what a very
real effort you have made to meet our point of view.” He commented
on the controversial points and suggested that the agreement be con-
summated after Arnold’s return to washing tor^.^'
His suggestion was followed. After further negotiations in Wash-
ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I June,
Air Vice Marshal J.C. Slessor signing for Portal.“ The correlative
principles accepted in London were repeated, with the added pro-
viso that revisions in allocation should be so framed that combined
strength in each theater should be maintained or increased. To con-
567