“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
the United States and Great Britain (and through them to other user
nations) in the Arnold-Portal agreement.* Based on the principle that
aircraft allocation should be guided by immediate ability to use the
planes in combat, the agreement had provided for revision when war-
ranted by changing conditions. In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than a
temporary guide, and by May of 1942it was apparent that the related
problems of allocation and deployment must be restudied.
That need had been implied by the British memorandum of 2 2 Feb-
ruary. Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had
been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase the allo-
cation of P-40’s for the Middle East in return for Spitfires to equip
AAF fighter units in England, by which expedient RAF Fighter
Command might build a reserve against the heavier losses which an in-
tensive offensive in Europe would On the American side there
were equally cogent reasons: unexpected attrition in the Pacific; the
rapid expansion of the training program with its operational training
units crying for combat planes; and the natural desire of the public
that US. planes be flown by U.S. crews. The demand from theaters
of U.S. responsibility for additional aircraft continued strong. That
was particularly true of the Southwest Pacific, where MacArthur
had assumed command on 18 April. A fortnight later, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff were alarmed by a query from Roosevelt as to whether air-
craft strength in Australia “could properly be” increased to 1,000,
ground forces to IOO,OOO. The question seemed momentarily to in-
dicate some wavering in purpose, but the President immediately
explained that his message had been merely an inquiry, not a directive.
H e wished to deploy in the Southwest Pacific only enough planes to
fulfil present objectives, and desired that existing arrangements for
Europe be carried out: “I do not want ‘Bolero’ slowed down.” s1
This was on 6 May; on the 17th he repeated the sentiment,s2 and a
week later a group of high-ranking Army and Navy officers left for
London for further discussion of BOLERO needs. In the group were
General Arnold and Rear Adm. John H. Towers of the Navy’s
Bureau of Aeronautics. They had been directed to confer with Portal
and a representative of the Fleet Air Arm, and to draw up a new
* See above, pp. 248-49.
t See above, p. 249.
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