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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Churchill”21 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 the United States and Great Britain (and through them to other user nations) in the Arnold-Portal agreement.* Based on the principle that aircraft allocation should be guided by immediate ability to use the planes in combat, the agreement had provided for revision when war- ranted by changing conditions. In Washington the Munitions Assign- ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than a temporary guide, and by May of 1942it was apparent that the related problems of allocation and deployment must be restudied. That need had been implied by the British memorandum of 2 2 Feb- ruary. Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase the allo- cation of P-40’s for the Middle East in return for Spitfires to equip AAF fighter units in England, by which expedient RAF Fighter Command might build a reserve against the heavier losses which an in- tensive offensive in Europe would On the American side there were equally cogent reasons: unexpected attrition in the Pacific; the rapid expansion of the training program with its operational training units crying for combat planes; and the natural desire of the public that US. planes be flown by U.S. crews. The demand from theaters of U.S. responsibility for additional aircraft continued strong. That was particularly true of the Southwest Pacific, where MacArthur had assumed command on 18 April. A fortnight later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were alarmed by a query from Roosevelt as to whether air- craft strength in Australia “could properly be” increased to 1,000, ground forces to IOO,OOO. The question seemed momentarily to in- dicate some wavering in purpose, but the President immediately explained that his message had been merely an inquiry, not a directive. H e wished to deploy in the Southwest Pacific only enough planes to fulfil present objectives, and desired that existing arrangements for Europe be carried out: “I do not want ‘Bolero’ slowed down.” s1 This was on 6 May; on the 17th he repeated the sentiment,s2 and a week later a group of high-ranking Army and Navy officers left for London for further discussion of BOLERO needs. In the group were General Arnold and Rear Adm. John H. Towers of the Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics. They had been directed to confer with Portal and a representative of the Fleet Air Arm, and to draw up a new * See above, pp. 248-49. t See above, p. 249. 566
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