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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Pacific Ocean”16 pages
P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N sive and allow time for the AAF to build a force appropriate to the invasion itself. In neither case did the plan follow exactly the earlier pattern of thought in the AAF-as exhibited, say, in AWPD/r.* T o the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive had figured as a most vital part of the over-all strategy: an operation which by the destruction of well-chosen targets might suffice to bring Germany to her knees or, more probably, would weaken her war potential to the degree that the success of an invasion would be assured. In the new plans-in SLEDGEHAMMER especially but to a lesser degree in ROUNDUP-the emphasis was on counterair measures; even strategic bombing was looked on as a means of pro- voking German resistance so that the Luftwaffe might be trimmed down and the Allies might secure that superiority in the air deemed necessary for a successful crossing of the Channel. The importance of this aspect of the air offensive had been appreciated in both allied air forces. RAF officers and General Eaker alike were of the opinion that an intensive bomber offensive would in itself constitute some- thing of a second front by drawing GAF strength westward; ’’ and Eaker feared, not without justification, that an attempt to build up air and ground forces simultaneously would react unfavorably against priorities which logic and previous designs had given to the AAF. But those opinions were submerged in the new strategy; air plans must be built around the alternative schemes for invasion. This meant, for one thing, a reappraisal of target objectives. General Spaatz ex- plained this necessity to Mr. Stimson by pointing out that whereas the European strategy had originally been conceived as involving the use of air power supported by ground forces, it was now a matter of air power supporting ground forces.28 The new strategy demanded also a re-examination of the needs of the Army air force in Britain in terms of trained units and equipment. That review was necessary first because the new mission could not be carried out with the B-17’s and B-24’s and fighters which had been intended as the bomber command’s striking force. The need now, as Arnold said, was for a “balanced force.” 2 9 But there were also wider issues touching the assignment of organized units to the various theaters and the allocation of aircraft production potential among the several nations. It has previously been shown that at ARCADIA the output of American aircraft factories for 1942 had been allotted to See above, pp. 148-49. 565
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