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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”26 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 transport planes; this force he was willing to commit if it became expedient.2 The British replied that they had been thinking along similar lines- of a grand invasion in 1943, or an earlier one if the Soviets were facing defeat or if the Germans showed signs of cracking.23They enumer- ated practical difficulties which would make an invasion in 1942 extremely hazardous-the limited period of favorable weather which could be expected; the serious shortages in shipping, in landing craft, and in air strength; and other factors which seemed scarcely to disturb the ordinary citizen who was crying for a second front, but of which General Marshall was painfully aware. Yet after further study of Marshall’s plan, the British on 14 April accepted it in principle; the main preparations should be timed for the following spring, with con- current arrangements for a lesser operation in 1942 if circumstances demanded.24The Prime Minister, in a radio message of 1 7 April, in- formed Roosevelt of his approval of the design; his sole proviso was that the Japanese and Germans must be prevented from joining forces in the Middle East. If that could be forestalled, he advocated a cre- scendo of activities against the continent, “starting with an ever- increasing air offensive both by night and day.” 2 5 His message may be taken as the official launching of the strategy which was to culmi- nate, a year behind schedule, on 6 June 1944. The Combined Staff Planners immediately began the long and intricate task of preparing for the movement, reception, and mainte- nance of the expeditionary force.26This phase of the operation was called BOLERO; the main invasion of spring 1943 was ROUNDUP, the earlier emergency landing, SLEDGEHAMMER. BOLERO com- mittees, with representatives of the several services of both nations, were established in Washington and London. Uncertainty as to which operation would be mounted made planning difficult for the AAF; its equipment and its role would be determined by the final choice between the two alternatives. The mission assigned to the AAF by the Combined Chiefs had been phrased in most general terms: the conduct in co-operation with the RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942. If SLEDGE- HAMMER became necessary, the AAF could contribute little to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A decision to hold off until ROUNDUP would enhance greatly the weight of the bomber offen- 564
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