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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”26 pages
P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N little political imagination to foresee the nature of the coming con- gressional elections if operations in the chosen theater were indefi- nitely postponed. The American position in respect to a second front was not with- out a certain weakness. What with the current rate of production, the heavy materiel responsibilities to allies, the status of trained units, and, above all, the dearth of shipping, the United States could not at an early date deploy and support in a European campaign any large forces. This meant that the British must bear the heaviest initial bur- den, and in March there was some doubt in the General Staff that they would underwrite a large-scale operation under those condi- t i o n ~ . ’ ~Nevertheless, study on the projected invasion continued throughout March, and on the 27th, WPD was ready with its “Plan for Operations in Northwest Europe.” Three days later AWPD added its accompanying plan for air operations.*’ The project called for an invasion of northern France either in autumn 1942 or spring 1943. There were to be four phases of air activities: preparation and train- ing; a preliminary strategic bombardment campaign; close support of ground forces during and after the landing; and a return to strategic targets when the proper equipment was released from covering the landing. The Combined Staff Planners doubted that the requisite air superiority could be achieved by September, but were confident of success by the following spring.” The plan was approved in principle by President Roosevelt, and on 8 April General Marshall and Harry Hopltins arrived in London to elicit British support. In his first meeting with the Chiefs of Staff Committee on the gth, Marshall urged that a firm decision be reached soon as to the locality and timing of the main Anglo-American effort; this was needed to guide production, allocation, training, troop move- ments, and the like. American preference for an early assault on western Europe he ascribed to the necessity of aiding the Red army and the desire to get U.S. troops into an active theater where they could gain experience in large-scale operations. The United States, because of its heavy commitments elsewhere, could not build up a great force in England before spring 1943; but if the Russian situation deteriorated badly, it might be necessary to mount a more modest 6L emergency operation.” By mid-September the Army would have in the United Kingdom one armored and two and one-half infantry divisions, supported by some 400 pursuits, 300 bombers, and zoo 563
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