“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N
suggested to Arnold that one group of heavy bombers be sent to
Egypt, even though it was realized that this reinforcement could be
made only by borrowing from Task Force BR.’” Arnold had declined
the request, and it was then agreed that the one group of heavies set
up for CAIRO was to go out only after the initial BR increment.”
O n z z February the British chiefs of staff proposed to the CCS a
new “Policy for Disposition of US and British Air Forces.” l6 This
memorandum greatly extended the scope of diversions from earlier
agreements. T h e United States was asked to provide additional air
strength for the Pacific, to conduct bomber operations from China
against Japan, to assist the British with heavy bombers in the Burma-
Indian Ocean theater and, if necessary, in the Middle East. Since
these commitments could be met only by utilizing the two heavy
bombardment groups scheduled for the AAF bomber command in
the British Isles, it was suggested that for the present the RAF
would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive against Ger-
many, with the AAF joining in “at the earliest dates practicable.”
T h e air deployments recommended in this memorandum received
strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered
on 5 March, in which the Prime Minister reviewed gravely, almost
pessimistically, the current strategic situation.“ T h e immediate pros-
pect was indeed gloomy. T h e Japs had swept southward with hardly
a check. Malaya was gone. The Netherlands East Indies and Burma,
already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was open to Jap-
anese warships and aircraft, and India itself was in danger. Rommel
was building up his forces for another push toward the Nile, and the
dreaded Axis pincers movement with a junction somewhere east of
Suez seemed an imminent possibility. T h e additional threat of a Nazi
thrust to the Caucasus in summer, and thence to meet the Japanese
in India, made of the Middle East a crucial area. T h e British public,
disappointed that promised victories in Egypt had been turned into
defeats, had been profoundly shocked by the bold escape from Brest
of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau on 1 2 February and by the fall
of Singapore on the r5th, and Churchill’s government was under
bitter criticism. It is little wonder that the Prime Minister had lost
something of his confident tone of ARCADIA days and had for the
moment less concern for the war in northwestern Europe than in dis-
tant parts of the empire. To gain additional air support for Australia,
Burma, India, and Egypt, he was willing to postpone MAGNET,
561