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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“The Wash”17 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 Department and had decided to adopt as a more limited objective the creation of a GHQ air The attainment of that objective would at least assure the concentration of offensive aviation under a central command and give to it a more or less independent mission. Experi- ence in World War I seemed to justify such an organization; its need had been explicit in Air Corps doctrine and had been accentuated by technological improvements in aircraft which extended range and increased bomb capacity. Opinion in the War Department had also moved toward acceptance of the idea of a GHQ air force. In January 193I announcement was made of an agreement between Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff, and Adm. William V. Pratt, Chief of Naval Operations, which broke, a t any rate for the time being, a long-standing stalemate be- tween the Army and Navy over the question of control of aviation engaged in coastal defense.52That agreement will be described more fully in another connection,” but it must be noted here that the agree- ment recognized the Army’s primary responsibility for coastal defense and thus opened the way for a new exploration of the role of the Air Corps in national defense. Subsequent War Department and Air Corps studies were reviewed by a board headed by Maj. Gen. Hugh A. Drum. Its report in October 1933 did not accept the more advanced ideas of the Army’s airmen, but it did recommend the creation of a GHQ air force of 1,800 planes. This concession encouraged members of the Air Corps to concentrate their efforts toward achieving that limited goal rather than continue the vain fight for independen~e.~’ Adoption of the central feature of the Drum Board plan was spurred by public agitation over casualties incurred by the Air Corps in its ill-fated venture in carrying the mail during the winter of 1934.Under a barrage of pointed questions as to the adequacy of equipment and training, two more investigating agencies were appointed-the Federal Aviation Commission headed by Clark Howell and the War Depart- ment’s Baker Airmen could expect little sympathy from Baker on his record of 1920or from the military members of his board, but its civilian membership seemed “safe” enough. The report sub- mitted in July 1934was, however, sharply critical of those Air Corps officers who had struggled for recognition of their arm.55 Like the Morrow Board, Baker’s group scorned any danger of air attack on the United States; the best means of national defense were the fleet, + See below, p. 62. 3 0
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