“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Department and had decided to adopt as a more limited objective the
creation of a GHQ air The attainment of that objective would
at least assure the concentration of offensive aviation under a central
command and give to it a more or less independent mission. Experi-
ence in World War I seemed to justify such an organization; its need
had been explicit in Air Corps doctrine and had been accentuated by
technological improvements in aircraft which extended range and
increased bomb capacity.
Opinion in the War Department had also moved toward acceptance
of the idea of a GHQ air force. In January 193I announcement was
made of an agreement between Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Chief of
Staff, and Adm. William V. Pratt, Chief of Naval Operations, which
broke, a t any rate for the time being, a long-standing stalemate be-
tween the Army and Navy over the question of control of aviation
engaged in coastal defense.52That agreement will be described more
fully in another connection,” but it must be noted here that the agree-
ment recognized the Army’s primary responsibility for coastal defense
and thus opened the way for a new exploration of the role of the Air
Corps in national defense. Subsequent War Department and Air Corps
studies were reviewed by a board headed by Maj. Gen. Hugh A.
Drum. Its report in October 1933 did not accept the more advanced
ideas of the Army’s airmen, but it did recommend the creation of a
GHQ air force of 1,800 planes. This concession encouraged members
of the Air Corps to concentrate their efforts toward achieving that
limited goal rather than continue the vain fight for independen~e.~’
Adoption of the central feature of the Drum Board plan was spurred
by public agitation over casualties incurred by the Air Corps in its
ill-fated venture in carrying the mail during the winter of 1934.Under
a barrage of pointed questions as to the adequacy of equipment and
training, two more investigating agencies were appointed-the Federal
Aviation Commission headed by Clark Howell and the War Depart-
ment’s Baker Airmen could expect little sympathy from
Baker on his record of 1920or from the military members of his board,
but its civilian membership seemed “safe” enough. The report sub-
mitted in July 1934was, however, sharply critical of those Air Corps
officers who had struggled for recognition of their arm.55 Like the
Morrow Board, Baker’s group scorned any danger of air attack on the
United States; the best means of national defense were the fleet,
+ See below, p. 62.
3 0