“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
heavy bombardment groups before too long-his guess of “about
March or April” was only a “shot in the dark.” Within the Air
Staff it was estimated that out of the 115-group program, sixteen
bombardment and five pursuit groups would be available for the task
force in the United Kingdom. Most of these units would be ready
only in the last months of 1942, but the Air Staff, accepting a spring
date for planning purposes, gave to the two heavy bomber groups
and supporting units a high priority.’ Thus on 15 January they
listed projected task forces in this order of urgency: ( I ) Task Force X
(heavy bombers for Australia); ( 2 ) Task Force FIVE ISLANDS
(for defense of South Pacific ferry bases); ( 3 ) Task Force BR
(bomber force for United Kingdom); (4) GYMNAST (Northwest
Africa); (5) MAGNET (Northern Ireland); (6) Task Force
CAIRO (to Egypt).g On 2 7 January the Combined Chiefs of Staff
agreed that the first two heavy bomber groups available should be
assigned to an American bomber command in the British Isles, to
“operate independently in cooperation with the British Bomber
Command.” l o Detailed plans for the initial movement of forces, now
calculated for I 5 May, were prepared for the Combined Staff Planners
by AWPD.” The task of building an organization for the proposed
force was begun under supervision of Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz, com-
manding general of the Air Force Combat Command and designated
leader of the Army Air Forces in Great Britain. On 4 February,
Brig. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, chosen to head up the bomber command,
left for England to arrange for the reception of the initial units.”
In view of the fluid tactical situation and the conflicting demands
from every theater, it was to be expected that AWPD’s suggested
allocation to Task Force BR of z I groups from the I I 5-group pro-
gram would be subject to later modification. More disconcerting was
the competition for the initial units earmarked by the CCS on 2 7
January and already tentatively designated by number in the AAF.13
Again it was enemy victories and their repercussions which threat-
ened accepted priorities. Reinforcements to Australia and the South
Pacific were dispatched pretty much as planned. MAGNET offered
little effective competition either immediately, or as time was to prove,
in the future. GYMNAST was shelved in March and was for a few
months out of the picture. But in the late winter and early spring
of 1942, the Middle East loomed as a new danger spot, perhaps as
the key to Axis strategy. At ARCADIA, Sir Charles Portal had
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