“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N
the recommendations of the Anglo-American staffs that the principal
war effort should be exerted first against Germany. The corollary
proposal, that “U.S. Army air bombardment units [would] operate
offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily
against German Military Power at its source,”l was accepted as
the AAF’s first and most important mission outside the Western
Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their
military staffs in the ARCADIA conference they were still deter-
mined, “in spite of recent events,” to knock Germany out of the
war first. But any decision in respect to the bomber offensive had to
be made with a cautious eye on the immediate situation in the Pacific.”
At the first session of the conference, the two chiefs of state
agreed informally and tentatively that AAF heavy bombardment
units should be sent to England according to earlier designs.* When
that agreement was formally adopted by the Anglo-American chiefs
of staff on 1 3 January 1942, the phrasing ran simply that “the move-
ment of US Army Air Forces to the UK should proceed as soon as
forces and shipping become available so as to increase the weight of
attack on Germany.” The date of deployment and the size of the
force would depend upon a complex of factors, many of them rooted
in the Pacific war. This meant, then, a delay of indeterminate length
in the fulfilment of any long-term plan built, as had been AWPD/I,
around a huge bomber force in England. It meant also scrapping
earlier estimates of more immediate deployments. ABC- I had called
for thirty-two AAF squadrons in the United Kingdom in 1941;
the original RAINBOW No. 5 tables listed four groups of bombers
and three of pursuits, to which an additional bombardment group was
added in the revised tables of 19 November.“ T h e Air Staff would
have preferred a more flexible and realistic commitment-“Those air
forces as dictated by circumstance” ‘-but in any event it had been
presumed that a t outbreak of war, or even before, a substantial
air contingent should be sent to the British Isles. Now that war had
come, there were more pressing needs.
The British naturally were interested in the projected bomber
force, but were anxious that it be provided without jeopardy to
current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut
was contemplated; and on I January, General Arnold told Air Chief
Marshal Sir Charles Portal that it might be possible to send two
See above, pp. 136-49,237-39.
559