“United Press”36 pages
- p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8
LONDON
The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada
Copyright 1948 by…
- p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary
judgment of the importance of this…
- p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani-
zation and, by default, leadership…
- p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing
for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
- p. 61 …It held that
there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
- p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures,
and Howell’s group…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States
and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
- p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could
be concentrated on either coast…
- p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval
air units, while the army attempted to…
- p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train-
ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
- p. 164 …A m y air units in the
Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
- p. 176 …no military alliances
were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans
only…
- p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy
bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
- p. 285 …From 1938 the United
States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
- p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and
lmmediate Deployment
On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
- p. 289 …ground units sent
in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major
invasion of…
- p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States.
Capture of…
- p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them-
selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
- p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart-
ment again pressed for an answer…
- p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle
East Air Force and later as…
- p. 430 …Attempts had been
made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United
States, but…
- p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no
opportunity to get set. The…
- p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters
already included many representatives of the…
- p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the
Netherlands East Indies, he was…
- p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved
that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed
trucks…
- p. 563 …Grady arrived from the
United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with
reference to…
- p. 564 …TO C H I N A
graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to
make high…
- p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became
almost a t once…
- p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate
offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily
against…
- p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air
units initially based there were to…
- p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United
Kingdom several months…
- p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with
its own under a plan eventually…
- p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was
(Patrick, United States in the Air, pp.
190-91.)
38. Charges of…
- p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941.
9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a.
92…
- p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45
Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E B A T T L E O F T H E A T L A N T I C
tude. Provision was made for transferring units, with the concurrence
of Operations Division, General Staff, to extracontinental areas on
a detached service basis. General Larson, as commanding general,
was responsible to the director of Military Requirements through
the director of Bombardment, but matters of policy, broad plans,
and the development of new weapons and equipment remained with
the Commanding General, AAF.84
Naval headquarters viewed the new command with but modified
approval. T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral
King had replied that, although he concurred in general, he believed
“the preferable method” to be the allocation of air units to sea fron-
tiers, such allocation to change from time to time and from frontier
to frontier as the exigencies of the war dictated. H e would, he said,
continue to exercise control over Army planes through the com-
manders of the various sea frontiers. The final settlement involving
the activation of the Antisubmarine Command he appears to have
considered a W a r Department measure
As a matter of fact, that settlement settled very little, except for
the resultant improvement in the internal organization of the Army’s
own antisubmarine forces. It left undefined the nature and extent
of the operational control to be exercised by the Navy; and it left
untouched the problem of duplication, the parallel development of
two land-based air forces for the same task. Consequently, within this
undefined area there remained ample room for continued debate and
confusion, especially in view of the fact that differences also re-
mained concerning the most effective way of employing long-range,
land-based aircraft in the antisubmarine campaign.
T h e story as it must be left in the present volume is thus an in-
complete one. T h e submarine presented a still increasing menace, and
the debate concerning the best organization for and employment of
antisubmarine air forces continued well into the summer of 1943.+
The story of the Antisubmarine Command will be presented in Volume 11.
5 5 3