“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E B A T T L E O F T H E A T L A N T I C
especially considering that it spent only a fraction of its time on
combat patrol. But the important contribution of SADU was made,
as intended, in the application of scientific and technological resources
to antisubmarine warfare.” It kept close contact with the National
Defense Research Council and kept in touch with radar experimenta-
tion at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, by agencies of
the U.S. Navy, and under the direction of other organizations both
public and private. At the same time, it initiated projects peculiar to
its own mission and by the end of the year its commanding officer,
Col. W.C. Dolan, would be able to report on some fifty-eight
pro jecmS1
Bur it was one thing to develop the weapons and tactics and quite
another to use them effectively. That demanded, in Dr. Bowles’
opinion, a correspondingly fresh organization constructed on prin-
ciples of physical mobility and unity of purpose. He preferred not
to raise the question of over-all unity of command. Rather, he pro-
posed to increase the effectiveness of the antisubmarine organization
within the Army itself, by which he meant the organization of all
land-based aviation connected with the antisubmarine program. This,
of course, involved the jurisdiction of the Navy, for that service,
having been successful in its attempt to secure land-based bombers,
was preparing to build up a land-based air arm of its 0wn.t This
tendency to develop two separate air forces, one in the Army and
one in the Navy, for the same task, Dr. Bowles recognized as a
fundamental weakness in the current program, and in doing so he
pointed to the issue on which the future of AAF participation in that
program depended, an issue resolved a year later only by the com-
plete withdrawal of the AAF from the antisubmarine effort.
He recommended, therefore, that an “Air Anti-Submarine Force”
be organized under the command of a general officer who would
control the entire land-based air component of the American anti-
submarine forces, including all land-based aircraft employed by the
Navy for the purpose. Like SADU, this force would be placed under
For a discussion of some of the technical innovations in antisubmarine warfare
resulting from this and other research programs, see Volume I1 of this history.
t Delivery of B - z ~ sto the Navy began in August. By the end of the year, de-
liveries had reached a total of 5 2 , and by I July 1943 had totaled 209, which figure was
slightly above that requested in February 1942 (see above, p. 539.) Total deliveries
for 1 9 4 3 were 308; for 1944, the total was 604. At the end of that year the cumulative
total of B-24 deliveries had reached the figure of 964. (Figures supplied by Office of
Statistical Control.)
5 5 ’