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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
aircrews was the search, the effort to locate an almost invisible object
in the vast stretches of the ocean. It often seemed like trying to find
the proverbial needle in a stack of hay, and as a matter of fact it
was possible for crews to spend hundreds of flying hours with barely
a sighting to show for the effort. It was, therefore, natural that radar
should become the greatest of all antisubmarine weapons. The Ger-
man submarines would not feel the full effect of this aid until 1943,
but its potentialities were initially explored during I 942.
As shipping losses mounted in the spring of that year, it had be-
come clear that to defeat the U-boat an expanded antisubmarine
force would not in itself be sufficient. Accordingly, on 3 0 May 1942,
General Arnold ordered his director of Technical Services to establish
the Sea-Search Attack Development Unit (SADU) with headquar-
ters at Langley Field. This organization was to concern itself primarily
with the development of tactics and techniques of antisubmarine war-
fare, making use of all special devices available or under develop-
ment. It was also to serve as an experimental group, testing and
demonstrating devices which might be submitted to it for considera-
tion, and as an agency for training crews in antisubmarine tactics. In
the course of this work of research, testing, and training, or in addi-
tion to it if need be, the unit was to participate directly in the de-
struction of submarines. SADU was further directed to establish
and maintain the closest possible liaison with “all other centers of
research and development relating to the elements, systems and tac-
tics” of antisubmarine ~ a r f a r e . ~ ’In order to free it from the en-
cumbrance of complicated command channels, the Commanding
General, AAF, assumed command of the new unit through his
director of Technical Services. Operationally, however, it came under
the control of I Bomber Command. It was activated on 8 June 1942.
In addition to Headquarters, 1st Sea-Search Attack Group, it was
assigned a tactical unit, the 2d Sea-Search Attack Squadron, which
eventually operated some ten ASV-equipped €3- I 8’s. In December
1942, the 3d Sea-Search Attack Squadron was activated in order to
test and modify the newly acquired B-24’s. On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two radar-equipped Liberators.80
The 1st Sea-Search Attack Group acquitted itself well in anti-
submarine operations. Owing to its superior equipment, it in fact
contributed somewhat more than its share of sightings and attacks,
5 5 0

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.