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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E B A T T L E O F T H E A T L A N T I C
aircraft, he suggested that a single sea frontier command be estab-
lished, extending from Maine to Mexico and covering the Atlantic and
Gulf areas, with a naval officer in charge of it. The specialized anti-
submarine command then being developed by the Army Air Forces
would be placed under the operational control of that naval officer.
T o this proposal, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox replied in much
the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer
to the antisubmarine problem lay “in augmenting our forces rather
than in further changes in the system of command which now seems
to be working effectively.” 7 6 In reply, Secretary Stimson stated that
the W a r Department was planning to provide for antisubmarine
operations all reinforcements “that can be diverted from other tasks.”
Specifically, 1 7 5 ASV-equipped bombers were to be furnished I
Bomber Command, and it was felt that this force would be adequate
if freed from restrictions “which are inherent in inflexible command
systems based upon area responsibility.” * 7 7
It was along these lines, the employment of radar-equipped, land-
based bombers within a flexible system of command, that Dr. Ed-
ward L. Bowles, expert consultant to the Secretary of War, had been
working for some time. H e urged in August that the antisubmarine
campaign be revitalized by extending the use of scientific aids. Spe-
cifically, he urged that radar and related devices be developed with
all possible speed and that the possibilities in long-range, land-based
antisubmarine aviation be realized by the employment of radar-
equipped B-24’s in substantial numbers. This revitalized force should
then be used in a co-ordinated offensive calculated to destroy the
enemy, not simply to protect hipp ping.'^
The AAF, through the initiative of Dr. Bowles and certain air
officers, had already taken an important step in this direction. Hunt-
ing submarines had proved a highly specialized undertaking, unlike
anything else the AAF had encountered. T h e attack itself involved
a curious duel between plane and submarine, each capable of three-
dimensional maneuver within the limitations of its peculiar medium.
But the most frustrating aspect of antisubmarine warfare for the
* Secretary Knox replied that, since rhe existing system of sea frontier areas had
been designed for use in all operations which might have to be conducted in or
from them, whether antisubmarine or otherwise, it would be a more flexible arrange-
ment to allocate fighting units to the several sea frontier forces than to “freeze” them
in an organization (such as the proposed antisubmarine command) designed for only
one purpose. (Memo for Stimson from Knox, 14 Aug. 1942.)
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