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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 258 …order to achieve this end we should cooperate with Japan fully un- quote.” Then: “ I 3…
  • p. 345 …seater aircraft operated by inexperienced personnel in cooperation with antiaircraft search- lights.” la‘ Many important objectives…
  • p. 425 …with brilliant judgment who must rely on cooperation,” * the ARCADIA conference of the British and American…
  • p. 566 …joined at Dinjan by Col. Merian C. Cooper. The task confronting them, to say the le…
  • p. 596 …There had even been talk of “mutual cooperation” rather than “unity of command.” Some firm decision…
  • p. 629 …the British Isles, to “operate independently in cooperation with the British Bomber Command.” l o Detailed…
  • p. 679 …the fullest agreement with the methods of cooperation which you propose and supremely confident that, at…
  • p. 793 …1942. 36. Ibid. 37. Col. Merian C. Cooper, Briefing 7'8 Officer, First Special Aviation Project…
  • p. 802 …Mar. 1943; talk by Col. M.C. Cooper in Gen. Johnson's Staff Meeting, 2 3…
  • p. 846 …5 5 2 Coolidge, President, 25, 28 Cooper, Col. M.C., 499 Coral Sea. Battle of…
T H E B A T T L E O F T H E A T L A N T I C
aircraft, he suggested that a single sea frontier command be estab-
lished, extending from Maine to Mexico and covering the Atlantic and
Gulf areas, with a naval officer in charge of it. The specialized anti-
submarine command then being developed by the Army Air Forces
would be placed under the operational control of that naval officer.
T o this proposal, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox replied in much
the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer
to the antisubmarine problem lay “in augmenting our forces rather
than in further changes in the system of command which now seems
to be working effectively.” 7 6 In reply, Secretary Stimson stated that
the W a r Department was planning to provide for antisubmarine
operations all reinforcements “that can be diverted from other tasks.”
Specifically, 1 7 5 ASV-equipped bombers were to be furnished I
Bomber Command, and it was felt that this force would be adequate
if freed from restrictions “which are inherent in inflexible command
systems based upon area responsibility.” * 7 7
It was along these lines, the employment of radar-equipped, land-
based bombers within a flexible system of command, that Dr. Ed-
ward L. Bowles, expert consultant to the Secretary of War, had been
working for some time. H e urged in August that the antisubmarine
campaign be revitalized by extending the use of scientific aids. Spe-
cifically, he urged that radar and related devices be developed with
all possible speed and that the possibilities in long-range, land-based
antisubmarine aviation be realized by the employment of radar-
equipped B-24’s in substantial numbers. This revitalized force should
then be used in a co-ordinated offensive calculated to destroy the
enemy, not simply to protect hipp ping.'^
The AAF, through the initiative of Dr. Bowles and certain air
officers, had already taken an important step in this direction. Hunt-
ing submarines had proved a highly specialized undertaking, unlike
anything else the AAF had encountered. T h e attack itself involved
a curious duel between plane and submarine, each capable of three-
dimensional maneuver within the limitations of its peculiar medium.
But the most frustrating aspect of antisubmarine warfare for the
* Secretary Knox replied that, since rhe existing system of sea frontier areas had
been designed for use in all operations which might have to be conducted in or
from them, whether antisubmarine or otherwise, it would be a more flexible arrange-
ment to allocate fighting units to the several sea frontier forces than to “freeze” them
in an organization (such as the proposed antisubmarine command) designed for only
one purpose. (Memo for Stimson from Knox, 14 Aug. 1942.)
549

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.