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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”26 pages
T H E B A T T L E O F T H E A T L A N T I C aircraft, he suggested that a single sea frontier command be estab- lished, extending from Maine to Mexico and covering the Atlantic and Gulf areas, with a naval officer in charge of it. The specialized anti- submarine command then being developed by the Army Air Forces would be placed under the operational control of that naval officer. T o this proposal, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox replied in much the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine problem lay “in augmenting our forces rather than in further changes in the system of command which now seems to be working effectively.” 7 6 In reply, Secretary Stimson stated that the W a r Department was planning to provide for antisubmarine operations all reinforcements “that can be diverted from other tasks.” Specifically, 1 7 5 ASV-equipped bombers were to be furnished I Bomber Command, and it was felt that this force would be adequate if freed from restrictions “which are inherent in inflexible command systems based upon area responsibility.” * 7 7 It was along these lines, the employment of radar-equipped, land- based bombers within a flexible system of command, that Dr. Ed- ward L. Bowles, expert consultant to the Secretary of War, had been working for some time. H e urged in August that the antisubmarine campaign be revitalized by extending the use of scientific aids. Spe- cifically, he urged that radar and related devices be developed with all possible speed and that the possibilities in long-range, land-based antisubmarine aviation be realized by the employment of radar- equipped B-24’s in substantial numbers. This revitalized force should then be used in a co-ordinated offensive calculated to destroy the enemy, not simply to protect hipp ping.'^ The AAF, through the initiative of Dr. Bowles and certain air officers, had already taken an important step in this direction. Hunt- ing submarines had proved a highly specialized undertaking, unlike anything else the AAF had encountered. T h e attack itself involved a curious duel between plane and submarine, each capable of three- dimensional maneuver within the limitations of its peculiar medium. But the most frustrating aspect of antisubmarine warfare for the * Secretary Knox replied that, since rhe existing system of sea frontier areas had been designed for use in all operations which might have to be conducted in or from them, whether antisubmarine or otherwise, it would be a more flexible arrange- ment to allocate fighting units to the several sea frontier forces than to “freeze” them in an organization (such as the proposed antisubmarine command) designed for only one purpose. (Memo for Stimson from Knox, 14 Aug. 1942.) 549
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