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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“United Press”36 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I1 of air operations, the main method of defeating the U-boat is to seek and strike.” H e continued, “The greater portion of the air available should always be engaged in the direct attack of U-boats and the smallest possible number in direct protection of shipping,” for it had been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only leads to heavy loss in merchant shipping.” 6 7 With the need for reform in the antisubmarine campaign in mind, and impelled by the desperate shipping situation, the War Depart- ment in May 1942 demanded action. On the 20th of that month, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, directed the com- manding generals of the AAF and the Eastern Defense Command to take necessary steps to improve the antisubmarine activity being undertaken under the First Air Force and the I Bomber Command. In addition to indicating certain physical reforms, he requested General Arnold to reorganize the I Bomber Command in such a way as to “fulfill the special requirements of antisubmarine and allied air operations, in consonance with the Army responsibility in operating in support of, or in lieu of naval forces for protection of shipping.” 6 8 By taking this action, the War Department recognized that the par- ticipation of its air arm in the war against the U-boat was no longer merely an emergency measure, but one likely to continue as long as the submarine menace lasted. And in doing so it found itself in a strong position. The AAF possessed vitally needed weapons and had already taken part in antisubmarine operations for nearly five months, during which time it had laid the ground work for an effective or- ganization, had developed special techniques, and had prepared plans for a more ambitious effort. The directive of 2 0 May stated further that, although unity of command was vested in the Navy, the Army must be prepared to submit recommendations and to take every action to make anti- submarine warfare fully effective. Accordingly, plans of a more or less specific nature soon appeared, plans embodying both the juris- dictional and the strategic policy of the AAF, sometimes in their more extreme ~ o T ~ s . ~ ~Official action, however, took a much slower course, dictated by the immediate, practical need for a compromise settle- ment which would recognize the primary interests of both services. In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined the War Department plan for reorganizing its antisubmarine program. The I Bomber Command 546
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