The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I1
of air operations, the main method of defeating the U-boat is to seek
and strike.” H e continued, “The greater portion of the air available
should always be engaged in the direct attack of U-boats and the
smallest possible number in direct protection of shipping,” for it had
been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only
leads to heavy loss in merchant shipping.” 6 7
With the need for reform in the antisubmarine campaign in mind,
and impelled by the desperate shipping situation, the War Depart-
ment in May 1942 demanded action. On the 20th of that month,
the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, directed the com-
manding generals of the AAF and the Eastern Defense Command
to take necessary steps to improve the antisubmarine activity being
undertaken under the First Air Force and the I Bomber Command.
In addition to indicating certain physical reforms, he requested
General Arnold to reorganize the I Bomber Command in such a way
as to “fulfill the special requirements of antisubmarine and allied air
operations, in consonance with the Army responsibility in operating
in support of, or in lieu of naval forces for protection of shipping.” 6 8
By taking this action, the War Department recognized that the par-
ticipation of its air arm in the war against the U-boat was no longer
merely an emergency measure, but one likely to continue as long as
the submarine menace lasted. And in doing so it found itself in a
strong position. The AAF possessed vitally needed weapons and had
already taken part in antisubmarine operations for nearly five months,
during which time it had laid the ground work for an effective or-
ganization, had developed special techniques, and had prepared plans
for a more ambitious effort.
The directive of 2 0 May stated further that, although unity of
command was vested in the Navy, the Army must be prepared to
submit recommendations and to take every action to make anti-
submarine warfare fully effective. Accordingly, plans of a more or
less specific nature soon appeared, plans embodying both the juris-
dictional and the strategic policy of the AAF, sometimes in their more
extreme ~ o T ~ s . ~ ~Official action, however, took a much slower course,
dictated by the immediate, practical need for a compromise settle-
ment which would recognize the primary interests of both services.
In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy
Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined the War Department plan for
reorganizing its antisubmarine program. The I Bomber Command
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