The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
down the antisubmarine aviation to regional commands fortunately
did not extend to the naval districts, for if the practice had been
followed there it would have vitiated the effectiveness of the air arm.
Mobility, on which this effectiveness was considered to depend, was
nevertheless seriously obstructed by the difficulty of moving aircraft
assigned to one sea frontier to meet sudden requirements in an
area under the jurisdiction of another.62 Although a function of
COMINCH, the antisubmarine campaign in the western Atlantic
remained in practice a decentralized effort, its flexibility, especially
in the deployment of land-based aircraft, and its integration of tactical
procedure seriously compromised by a rigid system of regional
A centralized command thus became the key to AAF thinking as
far as it concerned the participation of Army air units in the antisub-
marine war. That campaign needed other things, to be sure. It needed
better equipment, a better training program, a better communications
system. Above all, AAF observers felt it needed a truly mobile air
arm. But all of these requirements depended in one way or another
on the attainment of a more unified command. Opinion, however,
in AAF quarters was not quite unanimous as to the nature and extent
of this unified jurisdiction. Obviously the entire American anti-
submarine campaign, involving surface as well as air forces, would
profit by centralized control if any part thereof would. And, if oper-
ational control by the Navy were to continue, as seemed likely, then
it would be well for a single Navy commander, rather than several,
to exercise that control over AAF units. But many AAF observers,
apprehensive of the direction in which a unified naval command
would lead the air forces allocated to itl preferred to think in terms
of a unified command for antisubmarine aviation as a matter of
primary importance, assuming, no doubt, that such an air command
would be capable of answering the needs of the air arm even under
the over-all control of the Navy. Some felt that this command should
consist only of land-based units; others argued that it should also
include Navy and Marine heavier-than-air craft engaged in the anti-
submarine campaign. All agreed, however, that the successful partici-
pation of the AAF in the Battle of the Atlantic depended on the
creation of a separate command, comprising at least the AAF units,
responsible directly to Headquarters, AAF, and trained and equipped
for the sole purpose of hunting U-boat~.'~
54.4