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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
nothing to meet the problem of deploying land-based aviation effec-
tively in antisubmarine warfare. The trouble was that no single com-
mand, either in the Navy or Army, was solely responsible for the
conduct of the antisubmarine war. The result was that a multiplicity
of regional headquarters within a system constructed originally to
meet the needs of a static defense robbed the air arm of what the
AAF considered its primary advantage, namely its mobility as an
offensive striking force.
Most AAF units engaged in the campaign served under the opera-
tional control of the I Bomber Command, which remained the only
organization capable of co-ordinating such an enterprise. But the
I Bomber Command was still theoretically a bombardment force, and
as long as it retained a dual responsibility its training and tactical
development had literally to be carried on at two levels-for high-
level bombardment and for low-level attack against submarines. This
situation prevented it from concentrating as fully on the anti-U-boat
war as the nature of that conflict required. The system over which
it presided was, moreover, loosely integrated. The Civil Air Patrol
served under the I Air Support Command for operational control.
I Air Support Command, in turn, operated under the control of
I Bomber Command. Units of the Third Air Force, brought in as
an emergency measure t o meet the crisis in the Gulf area in May,
operated under the control of the Gulf Task Force of the I Bomber
Command. And this system, such as it was, as yet did not extend to
the Caribbean, where the Antilles Air Task Force operated inde-
pendently under the Caribbean Sea Frontier. Administratively speak-
ing, the situation was even more complicated because all units were
administered through either the First Air Force or the Third Air
Force, both of which had to go through their respective defense com-
mand headquarters before reaching Headquarters, AAF.e' Within
the Army itself, then, the organization was poorly adapted to meet
the challenge of an opponent that operated with extreme mobility
under a strictly unified command.
Another serious difficulty arose from the fact that the AAF units
were, according to joint agreement, allocated to the sea frontier
commanders. These allocations were treated by the Navy as more
or less permanent arrangements which, except in grave emergency,
would prevent the AAF units serving under one frontier commander
from operating in the territory of another. This tendency to tie
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.