The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I1
ranged widely and was avidly followed in the press, until the case
became essentially a trial of air power before the bar of public opinion
rather than of Mitchell on charges under the omnibus 96th Article of
War. Mitchell was found guilty as charged and suspended from duty
for five years, a sentence which brought his early resignation from
the Army.41 But, as one newspaper had predicted, “ ‘Mitchellism’ will
remain after Colonel Mitchell has gone.” 4 2
The verdict was highlighted by the almost simultaneous publication
of two conflicting reports on the status of military aviation. On 10
September the secretaries of War and the Navy had asked President
Coolidge to appoint a committee to consider “the best means of
developing and applying aircraft in National Defense.” 4 3 The request,
coming before Lampert’s congressional committee had reported, was
of questionable taste; it was widely interpreted as a means of counter-
acting unfavorable publicity from the Mitchell trial and the antici-
pated recommendations of the Lampert group. Coolidge, opposed to
the independent air force and to the troublesome Mitchell, named a
committee headed by Dwight W. Morrow. Critics of the existing air
regime were not soothed by the President’s letter of appointment
which expressed the hope that Morrow’s efforts would “result in
bringing out the good qualities of the Air Service.” 4 4 The Morrow
Board heard all the familiar arguments reiterated by familiar witnesses
(including Mitchell, awaiting trial), and its findings were released on
3 December in time to neutralize criticism of the Mitchell
The report was a general vindication of the status quo. It held that
there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and that our
air force compared favorably with that of any other power. Because
the board did not “consider that air power, as an arm of national de-
fense, has as yet demonstrated its value for independent operations,”
it opposed the creation of a separate air force; the unified Department
of Defense was rejected as too complex and inefficient. The report
recognized the distinction, insisted on by Patrick and the Lassiter
Board, between support aviation and the offensive striking force; but
the positive recommendations listed were only a sop to continued
agitation. The name of the Air Service should be changed to Air Corps,
which should have representation in the General Staff and two addi-
tional brigadier generals. The only concession to the move for depart-
mental reorganization was the suggestion that an assistant secretary be
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