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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“United Press”36 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 activities, they would have to be provided for the purpose of counter- ing the U-boat threat in whatever quantity considered feasible in the light of other commitments. Such being the case, the Air Staff preferred to retain possession of the antisubmarine bomber forces to be made available and to employ them in accordance with the Army responsibility set forth in Joint Action for operations “in support of or in lieu of naval forces.” In that way, it was felt, a serious duplication of equipment, maintenance, and supply would be avoided, which otherwise would eventually “deny the essential difference between armies and navies.” 5 6 The question of duplication was all the more serious because it was evident that the bombers requested were not to be employed exclusively for antisubmarine operations in the Atlanti~.~’In other words, the implications of the proposed transfer were far reaching in their effect on the fundamental question of control of land-based aviation engaged in seaward operation^.^^ General Arnold proposed, therefore, as a solution of the problem of providing additional forces for antisubmarine warfare a compro- mise which would retain the principle of ultimate responsibility as set forth in Joint Action and which enjoyed the support of precedent. In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of a Coastal Command, within the Army Air Corps, which will have for its purpose operations similar to the Coastal Command, Royal Air Force,” operating “when necessary” under the control of proper naval authorities. The advantages of such an organization, he felt, would be compelling. It would be uniquely trained and equipped for the job. It would also possess the flexibility necessary for anti- submarine action, and could readily be reduced in strength as the need decreased, the units then simply reverting to normal bombard- ment duty without becoming stranded wastefully in a naval program which presumably would then have no place for them.59 This pro- posal of General Arnold’s sounded the keynote for AAF policy in the negotiations which culminated in the creation of the AAF Anti- submarine Command. It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That the Coastal Command should provide something of a blueprint for a similar organization in the United States was very natural, for it had pioneered in anti- submarine warfare under circumstances roughly analogous to those 540
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