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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 5 …Imprint N March 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote to the Director of the Bureau of…
  • p. 138 …1939-4I N 28 January 1938 President Roosevelt declared our national defenses inadequate in the face…
  • p. 141 …changed our requirements for defensive aviation,” President Roosevelt strongly urged that $300,- ooo,ooo be appropriated…
  • p. 153 …When President Roosevelt initiated the move toward re- I 16
  • p. 160 …T h e first step was made public on 3 September 1940 when President Roosevelt revealed…
  • p. 165 …These sentiments were expressed by President Roosevelt in a radio address on 3 September: “This Nation…
  • p. 169 …In an address to Congress on 6 January 1941, President Roosevelt suggested the means; 9 5…
  • p. 170 …O n 9 July 1941, President Roosevelt requested the secretaries of W a r and the…
  • p. 171 …The British had prepared, a t the instigation of President Roosevelt, an estimate of munitions requirements…
  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 174 …cent; other nations, 10 per cent.'" President Roosevelt, anxious that as many planes as possible be…
  • p. 185 …President Roosevelt’s request for the report had been motivated wholly by considerations of logistics. But…
  • p. 199 …On 5 July 1941 President Roosevelt, in oral orders to the Army Chief of Staff and…
  • p. 220 …and it carried a threat which President Roosevelt described in terms of the greatest danger faced…
  • p. 258 …conflict between Japan and the U.S. Roosevelt attempt curve our independence stop we all know…
  • p. 273 …President Roosevelt specifically directed that reinforcements should be sent there with all speed, and MacArthur was…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …evening, the British party met with President Roosevelt and his military and civilian advisers a t…
  • p. 297 …O n 3 January President Roosevelt sent Mr. Stimson a list of muni- tions, with a…
  • p. 301 …In his address to the Congress on 6 January, President Roosevelt promised that “we shall not…
  • p. 302 …Ultimate decisions on major military policies were taken by President Roosevelt, as Commander in Chief of…
  • p. 304 …Leahy as personal chief of staff to President Roosevelt in place of Admiral Stark.'* It was…
  • p. 322 …given to the nation by Presi- dent Roosevelt in a radio address on 9 D e…
  • p. 331 …At the end of January, President Roosevelt advised the President of Venezuela that, in deference to…
  • p. 332 …During the course of a fireside report to the nation delivered by President Roosevelt on 2…
  • p. 352 …Secretary Stimson reported to President Roosevelt his conviction that the planes from even one carrier could…
  • p. 366 …raised objections which seemed convincing.8 President Roosevelt decided to adopt the more modest proposal of…
  • p. 370 …Elliott Roosevelt during the summer on an aerial survey of the east coast of Greenland in…
  • p. 400 …Elliott Roosevelt and others failed to locate a suitable site for an airdrome.120A satisfactory site…
  • p. 409 …mobilizing the resources of the airlines, President Roosevelt had signed an executive order on 13 December…
  • p. 465 …for effective resistance in the Philippines, President Roosevelt had decided early in February that the general…
  • p. 480 …the basis of a proposal by President Roosevelt: there would be a separate Southwest Pacific Area…
  • p. 499 …Apparently President Roosevelt himself played a role in initiating the expedition, although it is not possible…
  • p. 553 …Lauchlin Currie had gone to China as economic adviser to President Roosevelt for study of her…
  • p. 630 …in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which the Prime…
  • p. 632 …plan was approved in principle by President Roosevelt, and on 8 April General Marshall and Harry…
  • p. 633 …message of 1 7 April, in- formed Roosevelt of his approval of the design; his sole…
  • p. 635 …A fortnight later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were alarmed by a query from Roosevelt as…
  • p. 640 …in Norway-and they understood that President Roosevelt’s anxiety to get U.S. troops into…
  • p. 641 …On 8 July the Prime Minister informed Roosevelt that conditions favorable to SLEDGE- HAMMER would probably…
  • p. 642 …on the ~ 4 t h . ~ ‘Ap- parently Roosevelt gave his tentative approval in a telephone conver…
  • p. 753 …This book shows the close relations between Roosevelt and the Committee T o Defend America by…
  • p. 755 …Address by President Roosevelt at Washington, 27 Oct. 1941, in Peace and War, pp. 767-72…
  • p. 756 …Ltr., Roosevelt to Stimson, 18 Sept. 1941,in WP I-General. I I I . Release of…
  • p. 774 …Memo for Roosevelt from Stim- son, 14 Mar. 1942. 163. lbid. 164. History, Sixth Air Force…
  • p. 776 …Elliott Roosevelt, zIst Recon. Sq. to TAG, 8 Sept. 1941; memo for Col. Olds from Capt…
  • p. 779 …Elliott Roosevelt to TAG, 6 July 1941; Atlantic Bridge, pp. 27-29. 117. Ltr., Sec. of…
  • p. 780 …Elliott Roosevelt to T A G , 3 Aug. 1941 (Report # 3 ) ; ltr., Capt. Elliott Roosevelt to…
  • p. 782 …Memo for S / W from President Roosevelt, 6 May 1942, in ATC 321. 199. On the…
  • p. 790 …Mills to TAG, Mac- Arthur for Roosevelt, 11 Feb. 1942; msg. #5, Australia to Marshall, 2…
  • p. 802 …President Roosevelt had approved the induction as early as 18 December 1941, contingent upon approval of…
  • p. 857 …See also Coolidge; Harding; Roosevelt; Wilson. Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment…
  • p. 858 …Erwin, 330, 339-41, 512 Roosevelt, Capt. Elliott, 3 18, 344 Roosevelt, Pres. F.D., 101…
T H k B A T T L E O F T H E A T L A N T I C
planes of approximately 2 0 0 B-24’s and 900 B-25’s and B-z6’s.’l A
formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces
on 14 February sought provision for the transfer of a total of 400
9-24’s and 900 B-25’S, and expressed the hope that by allocation from
current production it might be possible to meet requirements for 2 0 0
B-24’s and 400 B-25’s prior to I July 1 9 4 3 . ~ ~It was argued by
Admiral Towers in support of the Navy’s claim that arbitrary limita-
tions as to type of aircraft or weapon employed should not be allowed
to restrict the effectiveness of either AAF or naval aviation. H e fur-
ther argued, citing the Army’s need for dive bombers which was cur-
rently being met in part by a Navy-developed type, the mutual
advantage of‘ an exchange of equipment.53 T o General Arnold’s
headquarters, however, the problem assumed a quite different aspect.
Preoccupied with the difficult task of meeting urgent defensive re-
quirements in all theaters and a t the same time of building up a
bombardment force with which to carry the air war into the heart
of Germany, that headquarters viewed the proposed diversion of
1,300 bombers with dismay. Estimated total deliveries of the B-24
type to June 1942 amounted only to 2 3 0 aircraft. Estimated deliveries
of all heavy bombers for the calendar year 1942 were no more than
would be required for the equipment of thirty-four heavy groups
set up without provision for depot reserve. As for the medium
bombers, it was anticipated that without further diversion the Army
Air Forces would suffer a shortage of 850 airplanes.54The AAF’s
first reaction was, therefore, expressed in the following unequivocal
terms: “There are no heavy or medium bombers available for diver-
sion to the Navy.” 5 5
At the same time, Arnold and his staff faced a serious dilemma.
On the one hand, they felt committed to the task of mounting the
strategic bombardment offensive against Germany, a task which al-
ready had been made tentatively a vital part of the combined Anglo-
American strategy and in which the Air Staff had great faith. On
the other hand, the German submarine attack, if not in some measure
countered, could quite conceivably prevent the build-up in the United
Kingdom for the bomber offensive-indeed, it could, and was, en-
dangering the entire Anglo-American war effort. There was conse-
quently no question but that Army bombers would have to be
employed in antisubmarine operations. If they could not be provided
in the numbers requested by the Navy for antisubmarine and other
539

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