“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H k B A T T L E O F T H E A T L A N T I C
planes of approximately 2 0 0 B-24’s and 900 B-25’s and B-z6’s.’l A
formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces
on 14 February sought provision for the transfer of a total of 400
9-24’s and 900 B-25’S, and expressed the hope that by allocation from
current production it might be possible to meet requirements for 2 0 0
B-24’s and 400 B-25’s prior to I July 1 9 4 3 . ~ ~It was argued by
Admiral Towers in support of the Navy’s claim that arbitrary limita-
tions as to type of aircraft or weapon employed should not be allowed
to restrict the effectiveness of either AAF or naval aviation. H e fur-
ther argued, citing the Army’s need for dive bombers which was cur-
rently being met in part by a Navy-developed type, the mutual
advantage of‘ an exchange of equipment.53 T o General Arnold’s
headquarters, however, the problem assumed a quite different aspect.
Preoccupied with the difficult task of meeting urgent defensive re-
quirements in all theaters and a t the same time of building up a
bombardment force with which to carry the air war into the heart
of Germany, that headquarters viewed the proposed diversion of
1,300 bombers with dismay. Estimated total deliveries of the B-24
type to June 1942 amounted only to 2 3 0 aircraft. Estimated deliveries
of all heavy bombers for the calendar year 1942 were no more than
would be required for the equipment of thirty-four heavy groups
set up without provision for depot reserve. As for the medium
bombers, it was anticipated that without further diversion the Army
Air Forces would suffer a shortage of 850 airplanes.54The AAF’s
first reaction was, therefore, expressed in the following unequivocal
terms: “There are no heavy or medium bombers available for diver-
sion to the Navy.” 5 5
At the same time, Arnold and his staff faced a serious dilemma.
On the one hand, they felt committed to the task of mounting the
strategic bombardment offensive against Germany, a task which al-
ready had been made tentatively a vital part of the combined Anglo-
American strategy and in which the Air Staff had great faith. On
the other hand, the German submarine attack, if not in some measure
countered, could quite conceivably prevent the build-up in the United
Kingdom for the bomber offensive-indeed, it could, and was, en-
dangering the entire Anglo-American war effort. There was conse-
quently no question but that Army bombers would have to be
employed in antisubmarine operations. If they could not be provided
in the numbers requested by the Navy for antisubmarine and other
539