The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H k B A T T L E O F T H E A T L A N T I C
planes of approximately 2 0 0 B-24’s and 900 B-25’s and B-z6’s.’l A
formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces
on 14 February sought provision for the transfer of a total of 400
9-24’s and 900 B-25’S, and expressed the hope that by allocation from
current production it might be possible to meet requirements for 2 0 0
B-24’s and 400 B-25’s prior to I July 1 9 4 3 . ~ ~It was argued by
Admiral Towers in support of the Navy’s claim that arbitrary limita-
tions as to type of aircraft or weapon employed should not be allowed
to restrict the effectiveness of either AAF or naval aviation. H e fur-
ther argued, citing the Army’s need for dive bombers which was cur-
rently being met in part by a Navy-developed type, the mutual
advantage of‘ an exchange of equipment.53 T o General Arnold’s
headquarters, however, the problem assumed a quite different aspect.
Preoccupied with the difficult task of meeting urgent defensive re-
quirements in all theaters and a t the same time of building up a
bombardment force with which to carry the air war into the heart
of Germany, that headquarters viewed the proposed diversion of
1,300 bombers with dismay. Estimated total deliveries of the B-24
type to June 1942 amounted only to 2 3 0 aircraft. Estimated deliveries
of all heavy bombers for the calendar year 1942 were no more than
would be required for the equipment of thirty-four heavy groups
set up without provision for depot reserve. As for the medium
bombers, it was anticipated that without further diversion the Army
Air Forces would suffer a shortage of 850 airplanes.54The AAF’s
first reaction was, therefore, expressed in the following unequivocal
terms: “There are no heavy or medium bombers available for diver-
sion to the Navy.” 5 5
At the same time, Arnold and his staff faced a serious dilemma.
On the one hand, they felt committed to the task of mounting the
strategic bombardment offensive against Germany, a task which al-
ready had been made tentatively a vital part of the combined Anglo-
American strategy and in which the Air Staff had great faith. On
the other hand, the German submarine attack, if not in some measure
countered, could quite conceivably prevent the build-up in the United
Kingdom for the bomber offensive-indeed, it could, and was, en-
dangering the entire Anglo-American war effort. There was conse-
quently no question but that Army bombers would have to be
employed in antisubmarine operations. If they could not be provided
in the numbers requested by the Navy for antisubmarine and other
539