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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”26 pages
T H k B A T T L E O F T H E A T L A N T I C planes of approximately 2 0 0 B-24’s and 900 B-25’s and B-z6’s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces on 14 February sought provision for the transfer of a total of 400 9-24’s and 900 B-25’S, and expressed the hope that by allocation from current production it might be possible to meet requirements for 2 0 0 B-24’s and 400 B-25’s prior to I July 1 9 4 3 . ~ ~It was argued by Admiral Towers in support of the Navy’s claim that arbitrary limita- tions as to type of aircraft or weapon employed should not be allowed to restrict the effectiveness of either AAF or naval aviation. H e fur- ther argued, citing the Army’s need for dive bombers which was cur- rently being met in part by a Navy-developed type, the mutual advantage of‘ an exchange of equipment.53 T o General Arnold’s headquarters, however, the problem assumed a quite different aspect. Preoccupied with the difficult task of meeting urgent defensive re- quirements in all theaters and a t the same time of building up a bombardment force with which to carry the air war into the heart of Germany, that headquarters viewed the proposed diversion of 1,300 bombers with dismay. Estimated total deliveries of the B-24 type to June 1942 amounted only to 2 3 0 aircraft. Estimated deliveries of all heavy bombers for the calendar year 1942 were no more than would be required for the equipment of thirty-four heavy groups set up without provision for depot reserve. As for the medium bombers, it was anticipated that without further diversion the Army Air Forces would suffer a shortage of 850 airplanes.54The AAF’s first reaction was, therefore, expressed in the following unequivocal terms: “There are no heavy or medium bombers available for diver- sion to the Navy.” 5 5 At the same time, Arnold and his staff faced a serious dilemma. On the one hand, they felt committed to the task of mounting the strategic bombardment offensive against Germany, a task which al- ready had been made tentatively a vital part of the combined Anglo- American strategy and in which the Air Staff had great faith. On the other hand, the German submarine attack, if not in some measure countered, could quite conceivably prevent the build-up in the United Kingdom for the bomber offensive-indeed, it could, and was, en- dangering the entire Anglo-American war effort. There was conse- quently no question but that Army bombers would have to be employed in antisubmarine operations. If they could not be provided in the numbers requested by the Navy for antisubmarine and other 539
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